Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide

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Preface

James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring

In June 1989, Poland held its first relatively free and fair election in decades. Polish voters used the opportunity to deliver a stunning rebuke to the communist regime: the Polish United Workers' Party, the regime's ruling party, suffered a devastating defeat, with Solidarity, the party of the democratic opposition, winning every contested seat in the lower house and all but one in the Senate. In 1990, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was elected president, the seemingly happy ending of one of the best known stories of the third wave of democratization.[1] Less well known is what happened afterward. In 1993, just three years later, voters used their newly acquired democratic rights to return the old communist party (now renamed Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, SdRP) to power, and in 1995, they elected SdRP leader Aleksander Kwaśniewski president in a match-up against democracy hero Walesa.[2]

This is a book about *authoritarian successor parties*, or parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but that operate after a transition to democracy.[3] In some cases, such as Poland's SdRP or Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT), they are former "official" parties of authoritarian regimes that continue to exist after a transition to democracy. In others, such as Spain's People's Party (PP) or Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes, they are new parties formed by high-level authoritarian incumbents either shortly before or shortly after a transition to democracy. While many people find the existence and frequent electoral success of such parties counterintuitive—why, in a democracy like Poland, would voters support a party with a history like that of the SdRP?—they are extremely common. As the chapters in this volume show, they are prominent actors in virtually

[1] On the third wave of democratization, see Huntington (1991).
[2] See Grzymala-Busse (2002: 3).
[3] See Loxton (2015).

every major world region. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, prominent authoritarian successor parties have emerged in *nearly three-quarters* of all third-wave democracies, and were voted back into office in *over one-half* of all third-wave democracies.

This is not the first book about authoritarian successor parties. Indeed, there is a relatively long history of studying such parties, under a variety of different headings. Scholars of post-communist Europe have produced a substantial body of work on such parties, and smaller bodies of work have also emerged on Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.[4] These works have generated important insights. In two groundbreaking books on communist successor parties in East Central Europe, for example, Anna Grzymala-Busse (a contributor to this volume) showed how these parties could draw on "usable pasts" from the previous dictatorship to win votes under democracy, and argued that they could help to structure party systems and even improve the quality of democracy.[5] In recent years, there has been a new burst of interest in such parties, with scholars such as Rachel Beatty Riedl, Dan Slater, Joseph Wong, and Daniel Ziblatt (all contributors to this volume) producing innovative and important works on related topics.[6] However, existing works did not conceptualize their subjects as a subset of a larger category of authoritarian successor parties, nor did they employ this term.

One of the editors of this volume (James Loxton) has been part of this new wave of scholarship, focusing in his earlier work on authoritarian successor parties of the right in Latin America.[7] In the course of his research, he became increasingly aware of the worldwide nature of this phenomenon. Authoritarian successor parties could be found everywhere from Mexico to Mongolia, Poland to Panama, Spain to South Korea,

[4] For a discussion of existing works, see Chapter 1 of this volume.
[5] See Grzymala-Busse (2002, 2007).
[6] See Riedl (2014); Slater and Wong (2013); and Ziblatt (2017).
[7] See Loxton (2014a, 2014b).

Taiwan to Tunisia. The literature, though, did not adequately reflect this. Existing works mostly examined these parties in specific regional contexts. They were often not well known to scholars of different regional interests, limiting the accumulation of knowledge. More fundamentally, political scientists—not to mention the general public—were not aware of just how prevalent these parties were, or how common it was for them to be voted back into office. Indeed, we ourselves were stunned at the prevalence and frequent return to power of authoritarian successor parties.

The goal of this book is to generate new knowledge about authoritarian successor parties and to spark a new scholarly conversation about this extremely widespread—but hitherto underappreciated—aspect of the democratization experience. To this end, it brings together chapters by leading Africanists, Asianists, Europeanists, and Latin Americanists, all of whom have either published on authoritarian successor parties previously, or possess deep country or regional knowledge that makes them exceptionally qualified to write on specific parties. In contrast to earlier works on this subject, this volume does not focus on a single region. On the contrary, it is unabashedly cross-regional in scope, with the aim of drawing attention to—and promoting a new research agenda on—authoritarian successor parties worldwide. Authoritarian successor parties require serious cross-regional analysis, concepts that can travel, and theory-building specific to this category. This volume takes up these challenges. No previous volume has adopted a cross-regional perspective, systematically documented the global prevalence of these parties, or developed a common vocabulary and shared set of questions.

The chapters focus on three broad puzzles. First, *why do authoritarian successor parties exist (and often win elections)?* When ruling parties of authoritarian regimes win unfair elections, this can be explained by the unevenness of the playing field. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, a core defining attribute of authoritarian successor parties is

that they operate *in democracy*. This means that they cannot rely on fraud, intimidation, or censorship to win elections. Why, then, do they so often perform well at the ballot box? On this issue, the contributors to this volume are largely in agreement: authoritarian successor parties often benefit from *authoritarian inheritance*. They may inherit valuable resources from the previous dictatorship that, paradoxically, help them to thrive under democracy. In their chapter, Herbert Kitschelt and Matthew Singer show that authoritarian successor parties often inherit large organizations and informal networks that facilitate clientelistic party-voter linkages. Analyzing Taiwan and South Korea, T.J. Cheng and Teh-fu Huang explore how parties inherited strong brands based on a history of economic development and national defense; financial resources; and, in the case of Taiwan's KMT, a vast territorial organization. In their chapter on personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, James Loxton and Steven Levitsky show how parties benefited from reputations based on the achievements of past dictators in areas ranging from public security to social policy.

Second, *why are some authoritarian successor parties more successful than others?* While these parties have been prominent actors in many countries, there has been considerable variation among them in terms of electoral performance and longevity. Here there is less agreement among authors, with chapters exploring a range of possible causes. These include disappointing governing performance (Anna Grzymala-Busse), the nature of the former authoritarian regime (Rachel Beatty Riedl), the competitive landscape (Adrienne LeBas), and loss of access to state resources (Timothy J. Power). Chapter 1 explores a number of additional possible causes, including the performance of the former authoritarian regime, the nature and timing of the transition to democracy, electoral institutions, and strategies for dealing with the authoritarian past. The range of explanations offered by the chapters suggests that variation in authoritarian successor performance is multi-causal. Given the authors'

disagreement about the relative importance of these potential causes, this topic is ripe topic for future research.

Finally, *what are authoritarian successor parties' effects on democracy?* In his chapter on Mexico, Gustavo A. Flores-Macías finds that the resilience of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has been harmful for democracy, with the party associated with subnational authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights abuses. Some of the chapters, however, offer a more sanguine vision. Dan Slater and Joseph Wong argue that Taiwan's KMT, South Korea's Democratic Justice Party (DJP)/Saenuri, and Indonesia's Golkar played an important role in stabilizing new democratic regimes (and before that, in encouraging transitions to democracy). In his chapter on "old regime conservative parties" in Europe's, the first wave's equivalent of authoritarian successor parties, Daniel Ziblatt comes to a similar conclusion, suggesting the robustness of this finding. In short, as Chapter 1 argues, authoritarian successor parties' effects on democracy appear to be neither wholly negative nor wholly positive, but *double-edged*.

This book has benefited from previous works on authoritarian successor parties, drawing on them liberally and including several of their authors as contributors. That said, it makes a number of original contributions, breaking new ground at the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical levels. Conceptually, it provides a new set of terms, definitions, and operationalizations—in short, a common language—to facilitate a new research agenda on authoritarian successor parties worldwide. Thus, it offers a definition of authoritarian successor parties that can travel across regions, and develops concepts such as *authoritarian inheritance* and its opposite, *authoritarian baggage*, which we believe provide a useful framework for analysis. Theoretically, its argument about authoritarian inheritance goes beyond existing works by demonstrating the range of resources that parties may inherit from authoritarian regimes; develops hypotheses to

explain variation in party performance; and provides a more systematic and nuanced account of the double-edged effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy than has existed previously. Finally, the volume makes an empirical contribution by bringing together chapters with a geographical scope that is unprecedented in the history of research on this subject, and by providing new data in Appendix I and Appendix II of Chapter 1 that illustrate, unequivocally, that authoritarian successor parties are not outliers or regional curiosities, but part and parcel of the democratization experience.

* * * *

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[8] See Roberts (2012).

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide

James Loxton

A surprising feature of democracy in many countries is that large numbers of people, after gaining the right to choose their leaders through free and fair elections, vote for political parties with deep roots in dictatorship. Since the third wave of democratization, *authoritarian successor parties* have become prominent actors in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America (Loxton 2015). In many countries, former authoritarian ruling parties (e.g., Hungarian Socialist Party, MSzP; Taiwan's Kuomintang, KMT; Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI; African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde, PAICV) and parties founded by high-level authoritarian incumbents shortly before or shortly after a transition to democracy (e.g., Spain's People's Party, PP; Bolivia's Nationalist Democratic Action, ADN; Ghana's National Democratic Congress, NDC; Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes) have been voted back into office. Many of them grew out of regimes responsible for large-scale human rights abuses. Nevertheless, there was life after dictatorship: authoritarian successor parties remained major political actors and were frequently voted back into office.

In this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of the concept of authoritarian successor parties and develop an original framework for analyzing them as a worldwide phenomenon. To this end, I present a new set of terms, definitions, and operationalizations—in short, a common language—to facilitate a new research agenda on this topic, and present a number of questions to serve as the basis for this agenda. The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I offer a minimalist definition that can travel across regions and thus allow for broad comparative analysis. In the

second section, I present new data revealing that authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common features of democratization worldwide: they have been prominent actors in nearly three-quarters of third-wave democracies, and they have been voted back into office in over one-half of all third-wave democracies. In the third section, I ask why they are so widespread, and argue that much of this is due to *authoritarian inheritance*: they may inherit valuable resources from authoritarian regimes that, paradoxically, help them to thrive under democracy. In the fourth section, I consider the flipside of the ledger—*authoritarian baggage*, or the liabilities of an authoritarian past—and examine the various strategies that parties can employ to offload this baggage. In the fifth section, I ask why some authoritarian successor parties are more successful than others, and outline a number of hypotheses to explain variation in their electoral performance and longevity. Finally, I examine the effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy, and argue that these are *double-edged*. While they can be harmful in a number of ways, they can also have surprisingly salutary effects.

Defining Authoritarian Successor Parties

Authoritarian successor parties are *parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes, but that operate after a transition to democracy* (Loxton 2015).[1] There are two parts to this definition. First, these are parties that operate *after* a transition to democracy. This

[1] For an earlier use of the term "authoritarian successor party," see K. Roberts (2012). Scholars have used various labels for such parties. In the context of the post-communist world, they have used terms such as "ex-communist parties" (Ishiyama 1997), "communist successor parties" (Ishiyama 1999a, 1999b; Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002), "post-communist parties" (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka 1999), and simply "successor parties" (Grzymala-Busse 2002). In other contexts, they have used terms such as "continuist parties" (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), "old regime parties" (Tucker 2006), "formerly hegemonic parties" (Langston 2006a), "former dominant parties" (Friedman and Wong 2008), "ex-authoritarian parties" (Jhee 2008), "formerly authoritarian parties" (Slater and Wong 2013), and "authoritarian legacy parties" (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013).

means that ruling parties of existing authoritarian regimes are excluded, even if the regime in question holds somewhat competitive elections, as in "competitive authoritarian" (Levitsky and Way 2010) or "electoral authoritarian" (Schedler 2013) regimes. To be sure, many authoritarian successor parties begin their lives as authoritarian ruling parties. However, after democratization, they become—if they survive—authoritarian successor parties. To illustrate, Mexico's PRI was an authoritarian *ruling* party until the country's transition to democracy in 2000; thereafter, it became an authoritarian *successor* party. An important implication of this part of the definition is that to win votes, party leaders cannot rely on the "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002) used by electoral authoritarian regimes, such as coercion, fraud, or the massive abuse of state resources. Authoritarian successor parties can, and often do, win large numbers of votes. To be considered authoritarian successor parties, however, they must do so while broadly abiding by the democratic rules of the game.[2]

Second, authoritarian successor parties emerge from authoritarian regimes. This can happen in one of two ways, corresponding to two distinct subtypes of authoritarian successor party. The first are *former authoritarian ruling parties.* Many authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century—both civilian and military—used "official" parties as instruments of rule.[3] In some regimes, this involved a formal "one-party" arrangement, in which all parties but the ruling party were legally proscribed; in others, it occurred

[2] In practice, it can sometimes be difficult to determine with absolute certainty whether this condition has been met, given borderline cases of democracy and the existence in some countries of what Way (2015) calls "pluralism by default," in which there is oscillation between unstable democracy and competitive authoritarianism. In Appendix 1.1 and Appendix 1.2, I rely on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) widely used Autocratic Regimes Data Set to score regimes as democratic or authoritarian. Other chapters in this volume (e.g., LeBas, and Kitschelt and Singer) use alternative operationalizations.

[3] There is a large literature on the role of parties in authoritarian regimes. See, for example, Brownlee (2007a); Gandhi (2008); Geddes (1999); Levitsky and Way (2012); and Smith (2005).

through a "hegemonic party" system, in which opposition parties existed and theoretically could contest for power, but in which competition was severely constrained.[4] Following transitions to democracy, former authoritarian ruling parties often continued to exist (though they sometimes changed their names), thus becoming authoritarian successor parties. Examples include Hungary's MSzP, Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP)/Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the Czech Republic's Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the Mongolian People's Party (MPP), Taiwan's KMT, South Korea's Democratic Justice Party (DJP)/Saenuri, Indonesia's Golkar, Cape Verde's PAICV, the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD), Mexico's PRI, Brazil's Social Democratic Party (PDS)/Progressive Party, and Panama's Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). (See Appendix 1.2 for a complete list of prominent authoritarian successor parties since the third wave.)

The second subtype is *reactive authoritarian successor parties*. As the name suggests, these are parties formed in *reaction* to a transition to democracy. They are new parties created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of an imminent transition, or by former incumbents shortly after a transition. By high-level incumbents, I mean figures such as heads of state, ministers, and key members of the security apparatus.[5] While such parties have received less scholarly attention than

[4] On the distinction between "hegemonic" and "one-party" arrangements, see Sartori (1976).

[5] In dictatorships that last for long periods of time, much of the population is often implicated in the regime in some way. Even Lech Walesa, one of the heroes of Poland's pro-democracy movement and its first democratically president after the fall of communism, is alleged to have served as an informant for the communist regime in the 1970s. (See Joanna Berendt, "Lech Walesa Faces New Accusations of Communist Collaboration," *The New York Times*, 18 February 2016.) In order to prevent the concept from being stretched to the point of meaningless, the definition of reactive authoritarian successor parties therefore excludes parties founded by individuals who held low-level positions in the former regime.

former authoritarian ruling parties, they are widespread. Examples include Spain's PP, founded in 1976 (as the People's Alliance, AP) by former ministers of the Franco regime such as Manuel Fraga; Bolivia's ADN, formed in 1979 by former military dictator Hugo Banzer; the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile, founded in 1983 by hardline *Pinochetistas* during a regime crisis that they feared would result in democratization; Ghana's NDC, created in 1992 by dictator Jerry John Rawlings after being forced to initiate a transition to multiparty elections (and eventually full democracy); and Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia, founded in 2012 by figures such as Beji Caid Essebsi, who had held numerous ministerial portfolios in the country's authoritarian regime before it was toppled in the "Arab Spring."

I add three notes about this definition. First, it is located relatively high on Sartori's (1970) "ladder of abstraction." As Sartori noted, this is appropriate for concepts designed to travel across regions, and thus for the purposes of this book. One of the major goals of the book is to launch a conversation about authoritarian successor parties as a worldwide phenomenon. To be sure, this is not the first study of such parties. A substantial body of work exists on authoritarian successor parties in the post-communist world,[6] and smaller but still significant bodies of work also exist on Latin

[6] On post-communist Europe, see Bozóki (1997); Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002); Dauderstädt (2005); Evans and Whitefield (1995); Grzymala-Busse (2002, 2006, 2007); Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski (1996); Ishiyama (1995, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000, 2001a, 2006); Ishiyama and Bozóki (2001); Ishiyama and Shafqat (2000); Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka (1999); Kuzio (2008); Lewis (2001); Mahr and Nagle (1995); Orenstein (1998); Rizova (2008); Tucker (2006); and Waller (1995). See also Ágh (1995); Clark and Praneviciute (2008); Doerschler and Banaszak (2007); Grzymala-Busse (1998); Gwiazda (2008); Haughton (2004); Haughton and Rybar (2008); Hough and Koß (2009); Kimmo (2008); Kirchick (2012); Komar and Živković (2016); Kopeček (2013); Kopeček and Pseja (2008); March (2006); Olsen (2007); Patton (1998, 2011); Phillips (1994); Pop-Eleches (1999, 2008); Racz (1993); Rizova (2012); Rybar and Deegan-Krause (2008); Spirova (2008); Stojarová and Emerson (2010); Thompson (1996); Vuković (2015); Ziblatt (1998a); Zimmer and Haran (2008); and Zubek (1994, 1995).

America,[7] East and Southeast Asia,[8] Sub-Saharan Africa,[9] and other regions.[10] To date, however, most of these works have had a regional focus, with only a handful of exceptions.[11] An unfortunate byproduct of this has been that these works have not always been well known to scholars of different regional interests. This has impeded the accumulation of knowledge and, more fundamentally, resulted in an inadequate appreciation of just how common authoritarian successor parties are. Given the range of regions covered by the chapters in this volume, and the volume's goal of encouraging cross-regional dialogue, I have therefore opted for a broad definition that can travel across space. Scholars focusing on particular countries or regions may wish to move down the ladder of abstraction and adopt a more detailed definition.[12]

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[7] On Latin America, see K. Roberts (2006, 2016) and Loxton (2014a, 2014b, 2016). See also Abente-Brun (2009); Ackerman (2012); Adrogué (1993); Aibar (2005); Azpuru (2003); Cantanhêde (2001); Copeland (2007); Crenzel (1999); Deming (2013); Flores-Macías (2013); Garrard-Burnett (2010); Harding (2001); Holland (2013); Jetté, Foronda, and López (1997); Joignant and Navia (2003); Klein (2004); Koivumaeki (2010, 2014); Kyle (2016); Langston (2006a, 2017); Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016); Luna (2010, 2014); Martí i Puig (2010, 2013); McCann (2015); Meléndez (2014); Olmeda and Armesto (2013); Ortega Hegg (2007); Peñaranda Bojanic (2004); Pérez (1992); Pollack (1999); Power (2000); Ribeiro (2014); Serra (2013); Sivak (2001); Sosa Villagarcia (2016); Thaler (2017); Turner (2014); and Urrutia (2011a).

[8] On East and Southeast Asia, see Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015) and Slater and Wong (2013). See also Cheng (2006); Copper (2013); Kim (2014); Muyard (2008); Park (2010); Suh (2015); and Tomsa (2008, 2012).

[9] On Sub-Saharan Africa, see Ishiyama and Quinn (2006) and Riedl (2014). See also Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005); Ibrahim and Souley (1998); Marcus (2001); Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005); Meyns (2002); and Whitfield (2009); and chapters in Diamond and Plattner (2010), Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013, 2014), and Villalón and VonDoepp (2005).

[10] On Southern Europe, see Balfour (2005), Hopkin (1999), López Nieto (1998), and Montero (1987). On South Asia, see Hossain (2004). On the Middle East and North Africa, see Masoud (2011, 2013), Romdhani (2014), and Zederman (2016). On "old regime conservative parties" in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, see Ziblatt (2017).

[11] See Haggard and Kaufman (1995); Jhee (2008); Loxton (2015); Shafquat (1999); and some chapters in Friedman and Wong (2008).

[12] In her work on East Central Europe, for example, Grzymala-Busse (2002: 14) uses a more detailed definition: "*[S]uccessor parties* are defined as the formal descendants of the communist parties—that is, the main political parties that arose from the ruling communist parties in 1989 and that explicitly claim their successor status." Such a move

Second, this definition focuses on the *origins* of authoritarian successor parties, and is intentionally agnostic about other important issues, such as how the party positions itself toward the legacy of the former authoritarian regime or the extent to which it draws upon that regime's organizational infrastructure. As the chapters in this volume show, authoritarian successor parties vary considerably on these dimensions. Some embrace the past; others run from it. Some deploy large authoritarian-era organizations to engage in clientelism; others win votes primarily on the basis of ideational factors, such as a party brand. For this reason, I treat these as "variable properties" rather than "defining properties."[13] Finally, the concept of authoritarian successor parties is used here to refer to parties that emerge from modern authoritarian regimes in the second and third waves of democratization (that is, from 1945 onward).[14] As Ziblatt's chapter shows, however, an important analogue can be seen in the "old regime conservative parties" of first-wave Europe, which are conceptual cousins of modern-day authoritarian successor parties.

A Worldwide Phenomenon

How prevalent are authoritarian successor parties? How common is it for them to return to power under democracy? To answer these questions, I put together a list of all

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down the ladder of abstraction has the benefit of greater specificity, or what Sartori (1970) called "intension." This greater specificity, however, comes at the cost of inclusiveness, or what Sartori called "extension." Thus, Grzymala-Busse's (2002) definition includes more information about the parties in which she is interested, but it excludes those that did not emerge from communist regimes (and therefore most authoritarian successor parties in Africa, Asia, and Latin America), as well as parties that downplay their authoritarian ancestry.

[13] According to Gibson (1996: 8), "[defining properties] define the concept; they provide the basis for excluding specific cases from the pool of cases being compared. Variable properties are characteristics associated with the concept, but their absence from a specific case does not provide grounds for removing it from the pool of cases being compared."

[14] On the first, second, and third waves of democracy, see Huntington (1991).

countries that democratized during the third wave. Drawing on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) Autocratic Regimes Data Set, I included all countries that they scored as having democratized between 1974 and 2010 (see Appendix 1.1 for full list).[15] In order to avoid biasing my sample toward consolidated democracies,[16] I included cases where the new democracy later broke down (and in some cases democratized again). The only cases not included were those in which the new democracy broke down so quickly that it was not possible to hold even a single free and fair election after the year of the democratic transition (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mauritania, Russia, Sudan, and Zambia).[17] Excluding such cases was essential, since a core part of the definition of authoritarian successor parties is that they contest elections under democracy. In total, I counted 65 countries that had experienced at least one transition to democracy.

I then examined each of these countries to see if a prominent authoritarian successor party emerged (see Appendix 1.1 for the list and Appendix 1.2 for details). By "prominent," I meant simply winning 10 percent or more in a single national election after the transition to democracy. A party could be scored as an authoritarian successor

[15] Some of the chapters in this volume use different operationalizations than my own (e.g., LeBas, and Kitschelt and Singer). However, as discussed below, using alternative operationalizations of democracy does not affect the main finding of this section: that prominent authoritarian successor parties have emerged in nearly three-quarters of new democracies since the third wave of democratization, and have been voted back into office in over one-half of all third-wave democracies.

[16] Looking only at democracies that consolidated would have made it impossible to examine one of the possible effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy discussed later in the chapter: the possibility that their return to power will trigger an authoritarian regression.

[17] Burundi could arguably be excluded on these grounds, as well. Although its 2005 elections were considered free and fair by observers, its 2010 elections were marred by violence, fraud allegations, and an opposition boycott. (See Human Rights Watch, "Burundi: Violence, Rights Violations Mar Elections," 1 July 2010, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/01/burundi-violence-rights-violations-mar-elections). Following the severely flawed follow-up elections in 2015, Freedom House changed its classification of Burundi from "Partly Free" to "Not Free" (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/burundi). Nevertheless, in order to avoid *ad hoc* coding, I include Burundi in my list of third-wave democracies, since Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) score it as a democracy from 2006 onward.

party *either* by having served as the ruling party of an authoritarian regime, *or* if it was formed by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of a transition to democracy/former incumbents shortly after a transition (see Appendix 1.1 for detailed coding rules). I made a number of conservative coding decisions. First, I excluded parties that had long histories predating authoritarian rule and later became official parties of authoritarian regimes, but held that position for less than 10 years (e.g., National Party in Honduras), on the assumption that their pre-authoritarian histories were likely to have been the main determinants of their identities and resources. Second, I excluded parties created by former high-level authoritarian incumbents more than one election cycle after the transition to democracy (e.g., Slovakia's Direction-Social Democracy, Smer-SD), on the assumption that their leaders were likely to have developed political identities independent of the former authoritarian regime in the intervening years. Finally, I excluded parties founded by authoritarian incumbents who went into opposition before the transition to democracy (e.g., Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD), on the assumption that their role as champions of democratization was likely to have absolved them of their links to the authoritarian regime in the eyes of many voters.[18] While including these three types of parties would have expanded my list considerably, I excluded them in order to avoid concept stretching. In total, I counted 47 countries that had produced at least one prominent authoritarian successor party.

[18] One borderline case that I include is Brazil's Liberal Front Party (PFL)/Democrats (DEM). The PFL/DEM emerged from a breakaway faction of the military regime's official PDS in the lead-up to the 1985 founding election. I score the PFL as an authoritarian successor party for two reasons. First, it was not formally created until after the transition to democracy. Second, it became the primary destination for former authoritarian incumbents and held such pro-military positions that, even though the PDS had been the official ruling party of the military regime, the PFL/DEM can be considered "the true heir" of the regime (Power 2000: 80; also Power, Chapter 8, this volume).

Finally, I looked at each party to see if it had been democratically voted back into office (see Appendix 1.1 for the list and Appendix 1.2 for details). For this, I set a high bar: *winning the presidency or prime minister's office in an election after the transition year.* Once again, I made a number of conservative coding decisions. First, I excluded cases where the party had contested democratic elections for a time, and then, after a democratic breakdown, returned to power through non-democratic means (Burundi, Central African Republic), given the definitional requirement that authoritarian successor parties contest free and fair elections. Second, I excluded one case where the party held the presidency for one term after the transition, but did not hold it in any subsequent election (Brazil), since it never won power in a direct election or in an election after the transition year.[19] Finally, I excluded two cases where the party held cabinet positions in coalition governments after the transition but never held the top job directly (Indonesia, Slovakia), since in countries with multiparty systems, it may be possible to serve as a junior partner in a governing coalition with only minimal electoral support. Again, while including such cases would have expanded my list considerably, I excluded them in order to avoid stretching the concept. In total, I counted 35 countries in which an authoritarian successor party had returned to power democratically.

[FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]

[19] For details, see Power (Chapter 8, this volume).

In sum, of the 65 countries that democratized during the third wave, *47 of them (72 percent) produced prominent authoritarian successor parties, and in a whopping 35 countries (54 percent), voters returned these parties to power in democratic elections*.[20]

Notable authoritarian successor parties also emerged in Germany, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guyana, Suriname, and Tunisia, but were excluded from my count because of small population size,[21] because the party formed after 2010, or in the case of Germany, because of complications arising from national reunification.[22] In Cape Verde, Suriname, Tunisia, and Guyana, the party was voted back into office. (See "Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties" section in Appendix 1.2 for details).

In short, authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common aspects of the democratization experience—a fact that, to date, has largely been overlooked. They have been prominent actors in nearly *three-quarters* of third-wave democracies, and they have been voted back into office in over *one-half* of third-wave democracies. For

[20] This broad finding is robust to changes in the operationalization of democracy. If we use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) Democracy and Dictatorship dataset, we find that 72 countries democratized from 1974-2008; in 51 (71 percent) of these countries, prominent authoritarian successor parties emerged, and in 39 (54 percent), an authoritarian successor party was elected back into office. If we use Freedom House data, we find that 44 countries made the transition from "Not Free" to "Free" from 1974-2015; in 30 (68 percent) of these countries, prominent authoritarian successor parties emerged, and in 23 (52 percent), an authoritarian successor party was elected back into office. Data available from the author upon request.

[21] Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) include in their dataset only countries that had at least one million inhabitants as of 2009.

[22] In March 1990, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, held democratic elections, thus ending over four decades of communist rule. Less than a year later, it was effectively absorbed into West Germany through national reunification. Because West Germany had democratized decades earlier as part of the second wave, and because its population was approximately four times that of East Germany at the time of reunification, I do not consider Germany a third-wave democracy and thus do not include it in my overall count. However, post-1990 Germany *did* have a prominent authoritarian successor party in the form of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/The Left, which I discuss in the "Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties" section of Appendix 1.2.

better or worse, authoritarian successor parties are a normal part of democracy: it is normal for them to exist, and it is normal for them to return to power.

Authoritarian Inheritance

The widespread existence of authoritarian successor parties—and their frequent success at the ballot box—is puzzling. If the Workers' Party in North Korea or the Communist Party of Cuba "wins" 100% of the vote in an uncontested election, this outcome can be dismissed as the product of totalitarian repression. Similarly, if the ruling party of a competitive authoritarian regime, such as Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) or Malaysia's United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), ekes out an electoral victory, this can be explained by the unevenness of the playing field. However, if a party with roots in dictatorship performs well or is even voted back into office *under free and fair conditions*, it is harder to explain. Yet that is what happens in *most* new democracies. Instead of saying "good riddance" after the fall of dictatorships, voters frequently use their newly acquired democratic rights to vote for parties rooted in regimes that previously ruled over them in an undemocratic—and sometimes brutal—manner.

Scholars who have attempted to make sense of this puzzle have found that authoritarian successor parties often succeed under democracy because they inherit valuable resources from the previous authoritarian regime. One of the earliest expressions of this argument can be found in Grzymala-Busse's (2002) seminal study of communist successor parties in East Central Europe. Many of these parties, she argued, benefited from "usable pasts" ("the historical record of party accomplishments to which the elites can point, and the public perceptions of this record") and "portable skills" ("the expertise and administrative experiences gained in the previous regime")

(Grzymala-Busse 2002: 5). Particularly in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where authoritarian ruling parties had carried out some reforms and engaged with the opposition during the communist period, they entered democracy with reputations for pragmatism and managerial competence, and their cadres possessed many of the skills necessary to thrive in the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics.[23]

In my own work on authoritarian successor parties of the right in Latin America (Loxton 2014a, 2014b, 2016), and on authoritarian successor parties more broadly (Loxton 2015), I expanded on such findings by developing the concept of *authoritarian inheritance*. Authoritarian inheritance refers to the various resources that authoritarian successor parties may inherit from authoritarian regimes—resources that, paradoxically, can help them to survive, and even thrive, under democracy. Potential forms of authoritarian inheritance go beyond usable pasts and portable skills, and may include a (1) party brand, (2) territorial organization, (3) clientelistic networks, (4) source of party finance, and (5) source of party cohesion.

First, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *party brand*. Party brand is a term used by scholars to denote the ideational component of parties.[24] According to Lupu's (2014, 2016) influential formulation, a party's brand is the image of it that voters develop by observing its behavior over time. Parties with strong brands come to stand for something in the eyes of voters. To the extent that they feel a sense of "comparative fit" between a party's brand and their own views, they become loyal partisans who consistently turn out to vote it at election time. Brand-building is crucial to party-building. Yet it is not easy to develop a well-known and attractive brand,

[23] In his discussion of the "red return," or the return to power of communist successor parties under democracy, Huntington (1996: 8) offers a similar reflection: "[P]erhaps all that the red return signifies is that people who have the political talent to rise to the top in communist systems also have the political talent to rise to the top in democratic systems."

[24] Parts of this section draw on Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (2016).

especially in the face of competition from older parties with already established brands and new parties trying to stake out their own position in the party system.

Authoritarian successor parties may be spared the difficulties of brand-building by simply inheriting a brand from the former dictatorship. While the idea of a popular brand derived from an authoritarian regime may seem counterintuitive, it is undeniable that some such regimes enjoy considerable popular support.[25] In Chile, when citizens were given the opportunity in 1988 to vote in a relatively free and fair plebiscite on whether to extend General Augusto Pinochet's rule for an additional eight years, 44 percent voted in favor. In Mexico, at the time of the transition to democracy in 2000, 38 percent of the population identified as "*priistas*," or supporters of the authoritarian ruling party—more than the two main opposition parties combined (Medina Vidal, Ugues, Bowler, and Hiskey 2010: 68). And in South Korea, surveys have repeatedly shown that its most popular former political leader is Park Chung-hee, the country's military dictator from 1961 to 1979, with 55 percent of those surveyed expressing a favorable opinion of him in 2006 (Suh 2015: 15).

In some cases, popular support for authoritarian regimes is based on "position issues," or the regime's position on the left-right ideological spectrum. Perhaps more common, though, is for such regimes to generate support on the basis of "valence issues," or issues about which virtually all voters share a preference, such as corruption, inflation, economic growth, national defense, and public security.[26] While voters may not wish for an actual return to authoritarianism, they may nevertheless feel nostalgic for aspects of the former regime if it was viewed as a competent steward of the

[25] In recent years, a significant literature has emerged on this phenomenon of "popular autocrats" (Dimitrov 2009). See, for example, Chang, Chu, and Welsh (2013); Rose and Mishler (2002); Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006, 2011); Shin and Wells (2005); and Treisman (2011). For more, see Conclusion (Loxton, Chapter 12, this volume).
[26] On "position issues" and "valence issues," see Stokes (1963).

economy, protector of public security, defender of the nation's borders, or opponent of corruption—particularly if the new democracy has been lackluster in these areas.[27] If an authoritarian successor party inherits this kind of brand, as in the cases of Chile's UDI, Mexico's PRI, or South Korea's DJP/Saenuri, it is born with a ready-made source of votes.

Second, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *territorial organization.* Parties rarely survive in voters' minds alone. Instead, most successful parties have an organized presence on the ground, whether in the form of formal branch structures, informal patronage-based machines, or social movements. These organizations play an indispensable role in disseminating the party's brand and mobilizing voters on election day. As with party brands, building a robust territorial organization is difficult. It is thus no surprise that scholars have found that parties that build upon preexisting mobilizing structures, such as religious associations (Kalyvas 1996) or labor unions (LeBas 2011), are born with an advantage.[28]

Authoritarian successor parties may be spared the hard work of organization-building by inheriting an organization from the former dictatorship. In the case of former authoritarian ruling parties—especially those that operated in regimes that carried out undemocratic elections—a grassroots organization well-suited for electoral mobilization may already be in place. After the transition to democracy in Taiwan, for example, the KMT was able to draw on "its immense organizational network at [the] grassroots level," which historically had "penetrated all state apparatuses and major associations in society" (Cheng 2006: 371). Indeed, even after its loss in the 2000 presidential election, "the KMT [was] still the only party with branch offices in every

[27] See Chang, Chu, and Welsh (2013); McCann (2015); and Serra (2013).
[28] The reason is straightforward: "Organization building does not come naturally or automatically to political actors. It is a difficult, time-consuming, costly, and often risky enterprise" (Kalyvas 1996: 41).

township and urban district, and it remain[ed] the party with the most card-carrying members" (Cheng 2006: 371).

In other cases, it may be necessary to "retrofit" authoritarian-era organizations originally designed for different purposes. El Salvador's Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), for example, was built upon a vast paramilitary organization called the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN).[29] ORDEN had been created and used by the country's previous military regime for spying and repression, including torture and extrajudicial executions, and is considered a precursor to the notorious death squads of the 1980s. After democratization, however, ORDEN was successfully repurposed into a grassroots, nationwide organization that could be used to mobilize votes for ARENA (Loxton 2014a).

Third, authoritarian successor parties may inherit *clientelistic networks.* Clientelism, or the selective distribution of material goods in exchange for electoral support, is one of the classic strategies used by parties of all stripes to win votes.[30] For this to be effective, however, it is necessary to have a clientele—that is, a group of individuals locked into a stable relationship of dependency with their patron. The patron must become known and be viewed as reliable by his or her clients, and clients must come to expect and depend on payouts from their patron. As with party brands and organizations, constructing a clientele represents a costly and time-consuming effort.

Authoritarian successor parties may be able to avoid this difficulty by simply inheriting clientelistic networks forged under authoritarian rule.[31] Most authoritarian regimes do not hold onto power through coercion alone; instead, they try to build

[29] The acronym "ORDEN" spells the Spanish word for "order."
[30] See Kitschelt (2000) and Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco (2013).
[31] For a classic analysis of how patrons are sometimes able to retain their clientelistic networks after a regime transition and subsequently "lend" these to political actors, see Hagopian (1996).

popular support through various means, including the selective distribution of material goods. Authoritarian successor parties that manage to transfer these clientelistic networks to themselves are born with an advantage. For example, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile sought to build popular support in shantytowns through selectively distributed handouts by military-appointed mayors. Many of these mayors later joined the UDI and brought with them their clientelistic networks, giving the party a strong base among Chile's urban popular sectors.[32] In their chapter (Chapter 2, this volume), Kitschelt and Singer argue that this is common, with authoritarian successor parties—particularly former ruling parties of regimes that lasted for many years—often entering democracy with their clientelistic party-voter linkages intact.

Fourth, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *source of party finance.* Parties need money for everything from campaign spending to organizational upkeep. Authoritarian successor parties may be able to avoid the difficulties of fundraising by inheriting a source of party finance from the former dictatorship. In countries where business was part of the social coalition backing the authoritarian regime, the party may inherit the reputation of being a trustworthy ally and thus enjoy business support under democracy. This was the case with several authoritarian successor parties of the right in Latin America, such as El Salvador's ARENA and Chile's UDI (Loxton 2014a). Similarly, in South Korea, close ties between business and the military regime allowed the DJP/Saenuri to draw on its "intimate ties to big business groups in order to raise political funds" (Cheng and Huang, Chapter 3, this volume) under democracy. In other cases, the relationship with business has been even more direct, with the party itself owning businesses. In Taiwan, the KMT "possessed hundreds of real estate properties and business enterprises, making it the richest party on earth and the sixth largest

[32] See Klein (2004) and Luna (2010).

conglomerate in corporate Taiwan," and giving it access to "ample in-house campaign financing" (Cheng 2006: 371).

Finally, and somewhat more speculatively, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *source of party cohesion.* Party cohesion refers to the propensity of party leaders and supporters to hang together—especially in the face of crisis. This is the Achilles heel of new parties. Many new parties collapse after suffering schisms during their early years. While scholars disagree about why some parties are more prone to schisms than others, Levitsky and Way argue that one of the most robust sources of cohesion is a history of "sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict" (2012: 870). When party activists have fought in the trenches together, they are more likely to be animated by a sense of mission and *esprit de corps*. Moreover, such struggles produce high levels of polarization, which exacerbates the "us-versus-them" distinction and raises the cost of defection to opposition parties (LeBas 2011; Chapter 7, this volume). While Levitsky and Way (2012) mainly have in mind revolutionary and anti-colonial struggles, there is good reason to believe that counterrevolutionary struggles may have similar effects (Slater and Smith 2016). When authoritarian regimes born in the crucible of such struggles eventually break down, they may bequeath this "us-versus-them" mentality and sense of mission to their partisan successors. This may help to explain why parties such as Taiwan's KMT, El Salvador's ARENA, Chile's UDI, and Cape Verde's PAICV, all of which have histories of violent struggle, have not experienced devastating schisms.

Another potential source of cohesion is a dominant leader. As discussed by Loxton and Levitsky (Chapter 4, this volume), this was the case with several personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America that were led under democracy by former dictators, such as Hugo Banzer in the case of Bolivia's ADN and

Joaquín Balaguer in the case of the Dominican Republic's Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC). These former dictators/party leaders combined what Van Dyck (forthcoming) calls "external appeal" and "internal dominance," meaning that they were popular with many voters and possessed undisputed authority within their parties. Both can contribute to party cohesion: internal dominance limits conflict, since the leader's word is effectively law, and external appeal also reduces the likelihood of schisms, since the leader's coattails discourage other party leaders from defecting. In the long run, however, this did not prove to be a viable source of cohesion, with parties such as ADN and the PRSC facing major crises after the deaths of their leaders.

To conclude, authoritarian successor parties may inherit resources from authoritarian regimes that can help them to succeed under democracy. This suggests that, paradoxically, there may be benefits to an authoritarian past for parties operating under democracy. Three caveats are in order. First, there is no guarantee that a party will inherit all—or even any—of the resources discussed in this section. Authoritarian successor parties vary dramatically in the amount and types of authoritarian inheritance that they possess. Several possible reasons are discussed later in the chapter, including the performance of the authoritarian regime and the nature and timing of the transition to democracy. Second, the effects of authoritarian inheritance may diminish over time. For example, if a party's brand is based on its reputation for providing protection against a perceived threat from the past (e.g., communism, foreign invasion), it may lose its appeal as memories of the earlier threat fade and there is generational turnover in the electorate.[33] Finally, while roots in dictatorship may provide some advantages to

[33] This may help to explain why older voters in South Korea were more likely than younger voters to vote for Park Geun-hye, the daughter of former military dictator Park Chung-hee, in the 2012 presidential election (Kim 2014).

authoritarian successor parties, they are hardly an unalloyed good—a topic to which I turn in the next section.

Strategies for Dealing with the Past

If roots in dictatorship can be beneficial to authoritarian successor parties in a number of ways, they can also be a liability. Invariably, much of the electorate will disapprove of the party's origins and thus be unwilling to support it. If the valuable resources bequeathed by an authoritarian regime to its partisan successor can be thought of as *authoritarian inheritance*, the opposite can be thought of as *authoritarian baggage* (Loxton 2015).[34] One source of authoritarian baggage for virtually all dictatorships is human rights violations. If an authoritarian regime has killed, tortured, or imprisoned large numbers of its own citizens, this is likely to haunt any party that emerges from it. Another potential source of authoritarian baggage is a poor performance in key areas such as the economy and national security. As discussed in the next section, while some authoritarian regimes can claim significant policy achievements, others perform disastrously. In extreme cases (e.g., Greece 1967-74, Argentina 1976-83), the baggage may be so great that outgoing authoritarian incumbents do not even bother to form a party, since they know that its chances of success would be nil.[35] It is more common,

[34] One way to think about this distinction is in terms of what Hale (2004: 996) calls "starting political capital," which he defines as the "the stock of assets [parties] possess that might be translated into electoral success." Authoritarian *inheritance* is a form of starting political capital. Continuing with this analogy, authoritarian *baggage* is the stock of *liabilities* with which parties are burdened that might impede their electoral success.

[35] No significant authoritarian successor parties emerged in either country at the national level. However, in Argentina, several such parties emerged at the provincial level, including Republican Force in Tucumán, Chaqueña Action in Chaco, and the Renewal Party of Salta. The existence of these subnational authoritarian successor parties can be explained in terms of authoritarian inheritance. While the 1976-83 military regime was a fiasco at the national level, in some pockets of the country, military governors could claim accomplishments. In Tucumán, for example, where

however, for authoritarian regimes to produce a mix of inheritance and baggage, with the proportions varying according to a variety of factors (see next section). If they wish to succeed, party leaders must craft strategies for dealing with the past, in order to maximize the benefits of their authoritarian inheritance and minimize the costs of their authoritarian baggage. In this section, I discuss four major strategies that authoritarian successor parties have used: (1) contrition, (2) obfuscation, (3) scapegoating, and (4) embracing the past.

The first strategy is *contrition*. This is the approach that Grzymala-Busse (2002: 6) describes as "symbolically breaking with the past." Communist successor parties in East Central Europe, she argues, were "both handicapped and helped by their past" (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 7). On the one hand, some of them had earned a reputation under communism for managerial competence and pragmatism, which constituted a *usable past*. On the other hand, they were burdened by their historical connection to "regimes widely despised by their own citizens" (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 2), which constituted an *unusable past*. In order to minimize the damage caused by the latter, Grzymala-Busse argues that parties had to engage in public acts of contrition, such as "changing the party's name, program, symbols, and public representatives," and "denouncing [the] former misdoings and crimes" of the former regime (2002: 73, 79). In countries where parties made these symbolic gestures and promoted a new generation of relatively unsullied leaders (e.g., Poland, Hungary), they were able to reinvent

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guerrillas had been stronger than anywhere else in the country, General Antonio Domingo Bussi, military governor from 1976 to 1977, effectively (and brutally) put down the insurrection. Under democracy, Bussi drew on his authoritarian past to bolster his credibility as a champion of "order," and was democratically returned to the governor's mansion. See Adrogué (1993), Aibar (2005), and Crenzel (1999).

themselves and quickly return to office, while in countries where they did not (e.g., Czech Republic), they were less successful.[36]

A second strategy is *obfuscation.* In this strategy, rather than acknowledging and expressing contrition for the past, the party tries to downplay it. One example is Brazil's Liberal Front Party (PFL), which was founded in 1985 as a breakaway faction of the military regime's official party, the PDS. Under democracy, the PFL became the go-to destination for former authoritarian incumbents, and was arguably the "true heir" (Power 2000: 80) of the military regime. However, because the PFL had broken with the regime in its final months, it was able to downplay its status as an authoritarian successor party. In 2007, in a particularly unsubtle act of obfuscation, it changed its name to "Democrats" (Power, Chapter 8, this volume).

Another example is El Salvador's ARENA. The party was founded in 1981 by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, who had been the deputy director of intelligence under military rule, and who became the public face of El Salvador's notorious death squads in the 1980s. As the country made the transition to competitive elections, he drew on the infrastructure of a vast paramilitary network created by the previous military regime in order to build his new party, as discussed above. Yet, while ARENA members strongly embrace D'Aubuisson's memory, they deny accusations that he engaged in extrajudicial violence and have actively sought to distance the party from the country's former authoritarian regime (Loxton 2014a).

[36] However, as Grzymala-Busse argues in her chapter (Chapter 5, this volume), authoritarian successor parties in Poland and Hungary eventually became "victims of their own success." Having built their brands on the issues of probity and managerial competence, they were harshly punished by voters and largely wiped from the electoral map when they failed to deliver. In contrast, those parties that did not make a clean break with the past, as in the Czech Republic, continued to exist and win a sizeable number of votes as protest parties.

A third strategy is *scapegoating.* This strategy involves distinguishing between a "good" dictator, whom the party embraces, and a "bad" dictator, whom it denounces. Although the party acknowledges the unsavory aspects of the former regime, it blames these entirely on the bad dictator. An example is Panama's PRD. The PRD was founded in 1979 by military dictator Omar Torrijos to serve as the regime's official ruling party. In 1981, Torrijos died in a plane crash and was replaced by Manuel Noriega, who continued to use it as the regime's official party. After the 1989-90 US invasion and resulting transition to democracy, the PRD fully embraced the memory of Torrijos, who had earned broad popular support by increasing social spending and winning control of the Panama Canal from the United States (Loxton and Levitsky, Chapter 4, this volume). To this day, the PRD's emblem is an "O" with an "11" inside it—a reference to 11 October 1968, the day of the coup that brought Torrijos to power (García Díez 2001: 570). However, the party categorically denounced Noriega, who had become notorious for his brutality and corruption. Thus, during the 1994 election, the PRD's successful presidential candidate, Ernesto Pérez Balladares, asserted that Torrijos "was a hero, and a great innovator," but claimed that "Noriega was an opportunist, a traitor and a disgrace to the country."[37]

A more recent example is Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia. The party was founded in 2012 by former high-level authoritarian officials after the overthrow of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali during the "Arab Spring." Like the PRD with Noriega, Nidaa Tounes attempted to distance itself from the disgraced Ben Ali, whose 1987-2011 period of rule had been infamous for its corruption and repressiveness. However, the party embraced the memory of Ben Ali's predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, who ruled for 30 years as

[37] Quoted in Howard W. French, "Panama Journal; Democracy at Work, Under Shadow of Dictators," *The New York Times*, 21 February (1994). For more, see Loxton and Levitsky (Chapter 4, this volume).

Tunisia's first post-independence president, and who many associated with the values of secularism and national independence (Zederman 2016). In order to highlight its connection to "Bourguibism," the party's founder, Beji Caid Essebsi, kicked off his successful presidential campaign in 2014 in front of the mausoleum housing the former dictator's remains.[38]

The final strategy is simply to *embrace the past*. In this strategy, rather than expressing contrition, obfuscating its origins, or scapegoating a disgraced former dictator, the party simply acknowledges and celebrates its authoritarian past.[39] It proclaims, loudly and proudly, the accomplishments of the former regime, and highlights the contrast between the supposedly idyllic state of affairs when the regime was in place versus the alleged dysfunctions of the present. In Suriname, this was the strategy of National Democratic Party (NDP) founder Dési Bouterse, who was a military dictator from 1980 to 1987 before democratically returning to the presidency in 2010. As *The New York Times* reported: "Rather than playing down his past, Mr. Bouterse has defiantly celebrated it since his election last July by Parliament. He has designated Feb. 25, when he and other soldiers carried out a coup in 1980, as a national holiday, calling it the 'day of liberation and renewal.'"[40]

As Loxton and Levitsky show in their chapter (Chapter 4, this volume), several personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, such as the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) and Bolivia's ADN, have also opted for this strategy. As parties whose identities were intimately linked to a former dictator—and who in most cases continued to be led by him under democracy—they had little choice but to

[38] See "Tunisia's Presidential Election: In the Shade of Bourguiba," *The Economist*, 4 November (2014).
[39] For a similar argument, see Deming (2013).
[40] See Simon Romero, "Returned to Power, a Leader Celebrates a Checkered Past," *The New York Times*, 2 May (2011).

embrace the past and hope that their authoritarian inheritance would outweigh their authoritarian baggage.[41] More surprising is Grzymala-Busse's finding in her chapter (Chapter 5, this volume) that embracing the past turned out to be an effective strategy in the post-communist world, as well. While she argued in her 2002 book that breaking with the past was crucial for the success of authoritarian successor parties in Poland and Hungary, the eventual demise of these parties—and the survival of unreconstructed ones like the KSČM in the Czech Republic—leads her to reconsider this earlier argument.

To conclude, while all authoritarian successor parties are born with authoritarian baggage (some more than others), parties have developed various strategies to deal with that baggage, including contrition, obfuscation, scapegoating, and embracing the past. They may also be able to employ hybrid strategies. For example, a party might embrace the positive aspects of the former regime (e.g., economic growth, public security), but show contrition for others (e.g., particularly egregious episodes of violence). Another possibility may be to pursue what Luna (2014) calls a "segmented" appeal, whereby a party communicates to one constituency in one way, and to other constituencies in different ways. Thus, an authoritarian successor party might enthusiastically embrace its past when talking to its core supporters, but downplay that same past when speaking to the broader electorate.

An important question for future research is why parties choose one strategy over another. One likely reason is the *amount* of authoritarian baggage: the greater the baggage, the greater the incentive to try and offload it through contrition, obfuscation,

[41] Such parties may also try to blame former regime underlings for misdeeds, as Peru's *Fujimorismo* has done with Vladimiro Montesinos, the intelligence chief of former autocrat Alberto Fujimori (Urrutia 2011a: 113). However, this version of the scapegoating strategy is unlikely to be very effective, as most voters will find it implausible that the autocrat was simply unaware of these activities.

or scapegoating rather than simply embrace the past. However, other factors are also likely to affect the constellation of opportunities and constraints facing party strategists. In Panama and Tunisia, for example, scapegoating was only possible because the authoritarian era could be divided into two clearly demarcated periods: the Torrijos and Noriega periods, and the Bourguiba and Ben Ali periods. Or, in the case of personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, the fact that the former dictator usually continued to lead the party no doubt contributed to the decision to embrace the past, since it is difficult to break with the person at the top of the party ticket.

Variation in Authoritarian Successor Party Performance

While authoritarian inheritance can help to explain the general prevalence of authoritarian successor parties, it is also clear that there is major variation among these parties on two key dimensions. First, they vary in terms of *electoral performance*. In some cases, they enjoy massive electoral support and are democratically voted back into office (e.g., Ghana's NDC); in others, they win fewer votes and never return to power (e.g., Malawi Congress Party, MCP). Second, they vary in terms of *longevity*. In some cases, they survive for long periods of time (e.g., Panama's PRD); in others, they eventually fizzle out and disappear (e.g., Guatemala's FRG). These two types of variation can be seen cross-nationally (see Chapters by Grzymala-Busse, Riedl, LeBas, Slater and Wong, and Loxton and Levitsky), as well as within the same country in cases where more than one authoritarian successor party emerged. In Spain, for example, the PP continues to be one of the country's major parties to this day, while the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), an important actor in the 1970s and early 1980s, no longer exists.[42] Similarly, as Power shows in his chapter (Chapter 8, this volume), Brazil's

[42] On Spain's UCD, see Hopkin (1999). On the PP, see Balfour (2005).

PFL/DEM was more electorally successful than the PDS/PP for the first two decades of democracy, but the two parties "traded places" in the 2010s.

What accounts for this variation? In the previous section, I discussed an important voluntarist factor: strategies for dealing with the past. Parties that craft effective strategies to offload their authoritarian baggage stand a better chance of succeeding than those that do not. However, as existing works and the chapters in this volume show, there are several factors that seem to affect authoritarian successor party performance, many of them more structural or institutional in nature. In this section, I discuss six possible factors: (1) performance of the authoritarian regime, (2) performance of the new democracy, (3) nature and timing of the transition to democracy, (4) electoral institutions, (5) authoritarian regime type, and (6) the competitive landscape.

The first is *performance of the authoritarian regime.* Authoritarian regimes vary dramatically in terms of how well they govern.[43] At one extreme, regimes in Taiwan and South Korea could claim extraordinary achievements in the areas of economic development and national security (Cheng and Huang, Chapter 3, this volume). In Taiwan, the KMT regime oversaw average GNP growth of 8.8 percent between 1953 and 1986, with the island going from having a GNP per capita similar to Zaire's in the 1960s to that of a developed country in the 1980s (Wade 1990: 38, 35). The experience of South Korea's military regime was similarly impressive.[44] In addition, both could claim to have protected their countries from serious foreign threats (the People's Republic of China and North Korea, respectively). At the other extreme, Greece's

[43] For an earlier reflection on the effects of authoritarian regime performance (though in this case applied to the issue of democratic consolidation), see O'Donnell (1992: 31-37).
[44] As Kohli (2004: 25) explains: "Starting from a war-destroyed, improvised economy in the mid-1950s, South Korea industrialized rapidly and in 1996 joined the 'rich man's club,' the Organization of Cooperation and Development."

military regime of 1967-74 and Argentina's military regime of 1976-83 led their countries to defeat in wars against geopolitical archrivals (Turkey and Great Britain, respectively), and in Argentina, the regime oversaw bouts of hyperinflation and negative economic growth (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 34-35). The closer an authoritarian regime is to the Taiwan/South Korea end of the performance spectrum, the more likely it is to produce an attractive brand;[45] the closer it is to the Greece/Argentina end of the spectrum, the more likely it is to produce only baggage. It is no wonder, then, that the KMT in Taiwan and the DJP/Saenuri in South Korea are among the world's most successful authoritarian successor parties (see chapters by Cheng and Huang, and Slater and Wong, this volume), while in Greece and Argentina, outgoing authoritarian incumbents did not even bother to form parties.

In addition to looking at issues such as the economy and national security, it is important to consider what Huntington (1991) calls "negative legitimacy" when assessing an authoritarian regime's performance. Negative legitimacy stems not from what a regime *does*, but from what it is *against.* It is defined in terms of the enemy from which the regime claims to have saved the country, such as "communism," "subversion," and "social turmoil" (Huntington 1991: 49-50). If an authoritarian regime takes power against a backdrop that much of the population perceives as profoundly threatening, it is more likely to enjoy negative legitimacy than if it takes power in an atmosphere of relative calm. This may help to explain the success of parties such as Spain's PP and Chile's UDI. Both grew out of authoritarian regimes that had come to power in the context of severe polarization (civil war in Spain and the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile), which enabled regime officials to make a compelling case

[45] According to Slater and Wong (2013: 719), especially important is a "history of successful state-led development," since an "impressive record of transformative accomplishments in the economic realm provides the kind of 'usable past' that aids a formerly authoritarian party seeking 'regeneration' under democracy."

that they had "saved" their countries from sinister forces. This, together with strong economic performances,[46] resulted in considerable regime support for both regimes. The fact that some of the major protagonists of the pre-authoritarian crisis period (e.g., Socialist Party in Chile; Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) remained powerful actors after the transition to democracy also likely encouraged some former regime supporters to vote for authoritarian successor parties, to serve as bulwarks against a return to the "bad old days."

A second possible cause of variation is the *performance of the new democracy.* Popular perceptions of authoritarian regime performance do not develop in a vacuum. Instead, they are affected by events that occur before and after the period of authoritarian rule. Negative legitimacy, as discussed above, hinges on what occurred *before* the onset of authoritarianism. What occurs *after* the transition to democracy is also likely to color how voters remember the past. The performance of the former authoritarian regime may come to look increasingly good in retrospect if the performance of the new democracy is sufficiently bad.[47]

In Mexico, for example, the transition to democracy in 2000 was accompanied by a mediocre economic performance and, during the presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006-12), an explosive drug war that resulted in thousands of deaths (Flores-Macías

[46] Economic growth under Franco was impressive: "Between 1960 and 1975, only Japan experienced higher rates of economic development than Spain" (Encarnación 2008: 445). While accounts of the "Chilean miracle" under Pinochet have been exaggerated (Domínguez 1998: 71), the regime's performance was very strong by regional standards during Latin America's "lost decade" of the 1980s. Perhaps most importantly, the Chilean regime ended on a high note, with an average of 6.2 percent annual growth during the last five years of authoritarian rule (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 176).

[47] In their analysis of survey data on "authoritarian nostalgia" in democracies such as Mongolia and the Philippines, Chang, Chu, and Park (2007: 78) write: "Many East Asian democracies are still struggling against a haze of nostalgia for authoritarianism, as citizens compare life under democracy with either the growth-oriented authoritarianism of the recent past or with their prosperous nondemocratic neighbors of the present."

2013; Chapter 9, this volume). It is therefore perhaps not surprising that survey data in the lead-up to the 2012 general election showed that 43 percent of the Mexican public believed that conditions had been better under the old PRI regime—a retrospective judgment that almost certainly helps to explain the victory of the PRI's presidential candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto (McCann 2015: 91-92).[48] In the post-communist world, Tucker (2006) has observed something similar at the subnational level: authoritarian successor parties have tended to enjoy greater support in regions where economic conditions were worse after the transition to democracy, and less support in regions where conditions were better. The upshot is that when new democracies perform poorly in key areas such as public security and the economy, voters are more likely to remember the former authoritarian regime in a positive light—and thus more likely to support parties with roots in that regime.

A third possible cause is the *nature and timing of the transition to democracy.* Democratic transitions are not all alike. In some, authoritarian incumbents exit in good times and largely on their own terms; in others, they exit in disgrace and have little influence on the terms of the transition.[49] When authoritarian regimes end on a high note, they are more likely to be remembered positively by voters and to leave behind electoral institutions favorable to their partisan successors. This was one of the findings of Haggard and Kaufman's (1995: 126-135) classic work on the political economy of democratic transitions. They found that the nature of the transition—specifically, whether it was a "crisis" or a "non-crisis" transition—had an important impact on the performance of authoritarian successor parties, or what they call "continuist parties." According to their data, regimes that democratized during the third wave under non-

[48] See also Flores-Macías (2013; Chapter 9, this volume) and Serra (2013).
[49] There is a large literature on modes of transition to democracy. See, for example, Hagopian (1990); Karl (1990); and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

crisis conditions—that is, without contracting economies or severe inflation—were more likely to produce viable authoritarian successor parties than those that came to an end in the midst of economic crises.[50]

In their work on "conceding to thrive," Slater and Wong (2013; Chapter 10, this volume) make a similar argument, highlighting the importance of timing for authoritarian successor party performance. In their view, the ideal moment to democratize is during what they call the "bittersweet spot." It is "bitter" because no authoritarian incumbent is likely to consider initiating a transition to democracy without first receiving some ominous warning that the *status quo* is unsustainable (e.g., declining returns in undemocratic elections, an economic shock, or an uptick in contentious politics). However, it is "sweet" because if the warning is promptly heeded and democratization conceded before the regime falls into terminal crisis, the authoritarian *ruling* party has a good chance of thriving in the new democracy as an authoritarian *successor* party. They argue that variation in timing helps to explain the differing levels of success of Taiwan's KMT (most successful), Indonesia's Golkar (least successful), and South Korea's DJP/Saenuri (intermediate level of success) under democracy.

A fourth possible cause is *electoral institutions*. Democracies differ in the rules that they use to structure elections, such as the formula for translating votes into parliamentary seats (e.g., proportional vs. first-past-the-post), the weight given to different electoral districts (e.g., equal weight to districts of similar population size vs. greater weight for some districts regardless of population, such as rural districts), and barriers to entry for new parties (high vs. low). As Riedl (2014; Chapter 6, this volume) argues, when authoritarian incumbents remain strong during the transition to democracy,

[50] For a similar finding, see Jhee (2008).

they may be able to impose electoral institutions that favor their partisan successors. In Chile, for example, the Pinochet regime ended in the midst of an economic boom in the late 1980s and was largely able to dictate the terms of the transition. One result was an electoral formula known as the "binomial system," which virtually guaranteed equal representation to the top two tickets in legislative elections, even if the winning ticket outperformed the runner-up by a huge margin.[51] Under democracy, this gave the country's two authoritarian successor parties, the UDI and National Renewal (RN), a percentage of seats in Congress that exceeded their share of the vote.[52]

In other cases, authoritarian incumbents have maintained less control during the transition, and their partisan successors have consequently had to operate in the context of less favorable electoral institutions. An example from the second wave is Venezuela, whose dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1952-58), fell from power after a mass uprising and fled the country. His followers subsequently formed a party, the Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN), which won 11 percent of the legislative vote in 1968, with the exiled Pérez Jiménez winning a seat in the Senate. Fearing that Pérez Jiménez might win the upcoming 1973 presidential election, the country's major parties passed a constitutional amendment prohibiting the former dictator from running for president, which undermined the CCN's main source of appeal and contributed to the party's demise (Martz and Baloyra 1976: 75-82).

Similarly, Guatemala's constitution barred FRG founder Efraín Ríos Montt from running for the presidency during the 1990s while he was at the height of his popularity, on the grounds that he was a former dictator.[53] In this case, however, the prohibition did

[51] See Siavelis (2008: 203-206). Chile's binomial system was finally replaced in 2015.
[52] However, the effects of the binomial system were not as disproportional as sometimes claimed (Zucco 2007).
[53] Ríos Montt was eventually allowed to run for president in 2003. By then, however, his popularity had declined considerably.

not have the same deleterious effects as in the case of Venezuela's CCN: in the 1999 general election, the FRG won the presidency with a different candidate by an overwhelming margin and became the biggest party in Congress. This case suggests that while electoral institutions matter for authoritarian successor party performance, they are probably not the decisive factor. Not only are they largely endogenous to the nature of the transition (a controlled transition is more likely to result in electoral institutions favorable to the authoritarian successor party than is a transition by collapse), but a party with broad popular support may perform well even in the context of unfavorable electoral institutions. Moreover, electoral institutions cannot explain within-country variation, such as why the PFL/DEM enjoyed a stronger electoral performance than the PDS/PP during the first decades of Brazilian democracy, or why Spain's PP managed to outlive the UCD.

A fifth possible cause is *authoritarian regime type*. While all authoritarian regimes share the characteristic of not being democracies, that is where their similarities end. Scholars have developed various typologies to describe these differences. For example, Geddes (1999) distinguishes between "personalist," "military," and "single-party" regimes, and Schedler (2002) distinguishes between "closed authoritarian," "hegemonic electoral authoritarian," and "competitive electoral authoritarian" regimes. Even among authoritarian regimes of the same type, there can still be important differences. Thus, in her study of military regimes in Latin America, Remmer (1989: 3) distinguishes between "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" regimes, and asserts that the "differences among military regimes are as profound as the differences between dictatorship and democracy." While there is no consensus on this issue, scholars have

advanced a number of plausible arguments linking authoritarian regime type to authoritarian successor party performance.[54]

In Africa, Riedl (2014; Chapter 6, this volume) finds that authoritarian regimes that incorporated local "big men" into the ruling coalition, such as the Rawlings regime in Ghana, tended to produce more viable authoritarian successor parties than those that tried substitute them with new elites, such as the regime of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB). The strategy of incorporation, she argues, resulted in "reservoirs of local elite support" (Riedl 2014: 106) that could be drawn upon to mobilize support for parties such as Ghana's NDC after the transition to democracy. In contrast, the strategy of substitution made these elites into an "arsenal of enemies" (Riedl 2014: 107) who contributed to the collapse of parties like Benin's PRPB.

Two other chapters in this volume make arguments linking the nature of the authoritarian regime to authoritarian successor party performance. In their chapter, Kitschelt and Singer (Chapter 2, this volume) emphasize the importance of authoritarian regime duration. They argue that former ruling parties of authoritarian regimes that lasted for at least ten years tended to inherit large organizations and informal networks that facilitated a clientelistic linkage strategy under democracy. By contrast, parties that emerged from regimes that lasted for fewer than ten years were less likely to inherit these resources, with implications for their chances of success.

In their study of personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, Loxton and Levitsky (Chapter 4, this volume) focus on a different factor: whether or not the party emerged from a personalistic dictatorship. While a handful of such parties managed to "de-personalize" and survive in the long term (e.g., Peronism in Argentina, the PRD in Panama), most collapsed after the death or retirement of their founding

[54] See, for example, Jhee (2008).

leaders. Thus, parties that emerge from personalistic dictatorships face severe challenges on the dimension of longevity.

A final possible cause is the *competitive landscape*. Party cohesion, as discussed above, is a major determinant of party survival. There are various possible sources of cohesion, including a history of violent struggle (Levitsky and Way 2012) and the presence of a leader whose undisputed leadership and strong coattails discourage defection (Van Dyck forthcoming). In her chapter, LeBas (Chapter 7, this volume) emphasizes the importance of another potentially important factor: the strength of *opposition parties*. While it was common for former authoritarian ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa to experience defection-fueled collapse after the transition to multiparty elections, some managed to avoid this fate. LeBas claims that one major reason that parties such as Ghana's NDC and Sierra Leone's All People's Congress (APC) survived was the existence of strong opposition parties and a polarized competitive landscape. While one might expect that authoritarian successor parties would benefit from a weak or divided opposition, LeBas argues the opposite. By promoting an "us-versus-them" dynamic, strong opposition parties contributed to authoritarian successor party cohesion by increasing partisan identification and raising the cost of defection. The absence of strong opposition parties, she argues, was an important factor in the disintegration of parties such as the Kenya African National Union (KANU) or the PRPB in Benin. Thus, LeBas argues that the performance of authoritarian successor parties depends not just on their own inherited resources, but also on the broader competitive environment in which they operate.

To sum up, authoritarian successor parties vary dramatically in terms of electoral performance and longevity. In this section, I have discussed several plausible hypotheses to explain this variation, but this is a topic ripe for further research. It is also

amenable to various methodological approaches, including large-N statistical analysis and within-case analysis of countries where more than one authoritarian successor party emerged (e.g. Spain, Brazil, Chile, Romania).

Double-Edged Effects on Democracy

Authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common features of the global democratic landscape. In the previous sections, I discussed three major questions that such parties raise: Why are they so prevalent? What strategies can they employ to deal with their pasts? And why are some more successful than others? In this final section, I turn to a fourth question: What are their effects on democracy? As parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes—and that in some cases remain openly nostalgic for those regimes—they would seem to be patently harmful. This suspicion, I argue, is well founded. Authoritarian successor parties can (1) hinder processes of transitional justice, (2) prop up vestiges of authoritarianism, and, in extreme cases, even (3) trigger an authoritarian regression. However, they can also have surprisingly salutary effects on democracy. Authoritarian successor parties can (4) promote party system institutionalization, (5) incorporate potential "spoilers" into the democratic system, and potentially even (6) encourage new transitions to democracy in other countries. In short, the impact of authoritarian successor parties on democracy appears not to be entirely negative, but rather *double-edged*.

One way that authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy is by *hindering processes of transitional justice.* While it may seem easier to let sleeping dogs lie, scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that it is imperative to hold human rights violators accountable after democratization. While their book is best known for its advocacy of pacts as a means of securing the "vital interests" of key

actors such as the military, they also argue that "transitional actors must satisfy not only vital interests but also *vital ideals*—standards of what is decent and just" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 30; emphasis added). "Some horrors," they write, "are too unspeakable and too fresh to permit actors to ignore them," and thus "the 'least worst' strategy…is to muster the political and personal courage to impose judgment upon those accused of gross violations of human rights under the previous regime" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 30).[55] As parties that emerge from regimes that, in many cases, committed large-scale human rights abuses, authoritarian successor parties may have strong incentives to block processes of transitional justice. This may be out of normative convictions (i.e., "the military saved the country and thus deserve to be celebrated, not persecuted"), electoral considerations (drawing attention to the unseemly side of the former regime may cost the party votes), or because party leaders themselves could end up in the hot seat in the event of human rights trials.

There are many examples of authoritarian successor parties using their influence to shield human rights violators. In Panama, one of the first acts of newly elected President Ernesto Pérez Balladares of the PRD after taking office in 1994—barely four years after the US invasion that toppled Manuel Noriega and installed a democratic regime—was to issue pardons to hundreds of former authoritarian officials for crimes ranging from corruption to murder.[56] In Suriname, after winning the presidency in 2010, NDP leader and former military dictator Dési Bouterse passed an amnesty for himself for the execution of several prominent political opponents during his 1980-87

[55] In addition to satisfying an ethical imperative, holding human rights trials may help to decrease the probability of human rights violations in the future (Sikkink 2011).
[56] See Larry Rohter, "Some Familiar Faces Return to Power in Panama," *The New York Times*, 9 February 1995.

dictatorship.[57] In Mexico, the PRI used its strength during the transition to democracy to prevent any serious accountability for abuses committed during its seventy-one-year-long dictatorship (Treviño-Rangel 2012). In the post-communist world, transitional justice seems to have ebbed and flowed depending on whether or not a communist successor party was in office (González-Enríquez 2001: 245, 247); and when such parties implemented their own transitional justice, these tended to be mild measures introduced preemptively in order to avoid harsher measures later (Nalepa 2010).[58] Finally, in Guatemala, FRG founder Efraín Ríos Montt was able to avoid prosecution for the genocidal violence of his 1982-83 dictatorship because of the parliamentary immunity that he enjoyed as a congressman. It was not until after the 2011 general election, when the FRG's poor showing caused Ríos Montt to lose his seat, that he was tried and found guilty of genocide by a Guatemalan court.[59]

A second way that authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy is by *propping up vestiges of authoritarianism*. Scholars have become increasingly aware of how authoritarian-era institutions and practices may persist after a transition to democracy.[60] Two kinds of authoritarian vestige are particularly noteworthy. First, outgoing authoritarian incumbents may leave behind *authoritarian enclaves* (Garretón 2003), or undemocratic institutions such as tutelary powers for the military that limit the

[57] See "Suriname parliament gives President Bouterse immunity," *BBC News*, 5 April 2012.
[58] In Nalepa's (2010: 169) words, they needed to "scratch themselves a little bit to avoid a blow."
[59] See Juan Carlos Pérez Salazar, "Ríos Montt: de mandatario a culpable de genocidio," *BBC Mundo*, 10 May 2013. However, this verdict was overturned shortly thereafter by the Constitutional Court on procedural grounds. See Elisabeth Malkin, "Guatemalan Court Overturns Genocide Conviction of Ex-Dictator," *The New York Times*, 20 May (2013).
[60] See, for example, Albertus and Menaldo (2017).

ability of elected governments to govern.[61] Second, non-democratic practices may continue at the subnational level following a national-level transition to democracy. In recent years, a growing literature has examined this phenomenon of *subnational authoritarianism*.[62] As parties that emerge from dictatorships, authoritarian successor parties may be motivated by ideology, self-interest, or a sense of ownership to prop up both kinds of authoritarian vestige.

An example of a party propping up authoritarian enclaves is Chile's UDI. The UDI's founder, Jaime Guzmán, was the main ideologue of the Pinochet regime and the architect of its 1980 constitution. This constitution included a number of undemocratic features, such as appointed senators, tutelary powers for the military, and restrictions on various forms of political activity.[63] After the end of military rule in 1990, elected governments slowly managed to whittle down most of these provisions. The UDI, however, remained a steadfast opponent of constitutional reform, with Guzmán boasting that the UDI was "virtually the only movement that is not in favor of modifying the Constitution" (Guzmán 2008: 186).[64] As Power discusses (Chapter 8, this volume), Brazil's PDS/PP and PFL/DEM were similarly supportive of authoritarian enclaves, showing greater support for military prerogatives than any of the country's other major parties.

An example of an authoritarian successor party propping up pockets of subnational authoritarianism is Mexico's PRI. In 2000, the PRI lost power at the national level, but retained control of a majority of state governments (Flores-Macías,

[61] Other terms used to describe such phenomena include "reserved domains" (Valenzuela 1992) and "military prerogatives" (Stepan 1988).
[62] See, for example, Gibson (2012) and Giraudy (2015).
[63] See Siavelis (2008: 191-192).
[64] Guzmán wrote these words in 1987, in the lead-up to the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet's rule.

this volume).[65] In some of the states under its control, the PRI continued to employ the same kinds of dirty tricks that it had previously used at the national level, such as fraud, intimidation of opponents, and the abuse of state resources (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015). It was in part thanks to these pockets of subnational authoritarianism that the PRI was able to regroup after its 2000 defeat, and in 2012, catapult back to the presidency (Flores-Macías 2013; Chapter 9, this volume).[66]

Finally, in extreme cases, authoritarian successor parties may *trigger an authoritarian regression if elected back into office*. New democracies are often precarious, and there is good reason to think that the leaders of authoritarian successor parties would make for poor stewards of the new regime. For one, they may lack a normative commitment to democracy. As former authoritarian incumbents, they are likely to have few qualms about authoritarianism. Indeed, they may wish for nothing more than to return to the *status quo ante.* They may also simply possess greater authoritarian know-how than their competitors. Other parties may also wish to perpetuate themselves in power through less-than-democratic means, but lack skills in the art of authoritarianism (skills that are especially important in electoral authoritarian regimes, where authoritarian behavior must be balanced with an outward respect for democratic forms).[67]

An example of an authoritarian successor party whose return to power triggered an authoritarian regression is the Dominican Republic's PRSC. In 1978, dictator Joaquín Balaguer was defeated in a presidential election, resulting in Latin America's

[65] Remarkably, the PRI continued to control over half of all state governments in Mexico until 2016, when the number of state governments it controlled fell to 15 of 32 (Flores-Macías, Chapter 9, this volume).
[66] The same occurred in Brazil, with the PFL/DEM governing in an authoritarian manner in some of the country's poor northeastern sates, such as Bahia (Durazo Herrmann 2014; Souza 2016).
[67] See Schedler (2002, 2013) and Levitsky and Way (2010).

first third-wave transition to democracy. But in 1986, Balaguer was voted back into office as the candidate of the PRSC, whereupon he installed a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2010: 132-137). Another example is the Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA), the official party of the dictatorship of Didier Ratsiraka. AREMA lost the founding democratic election of 1993, but Ratsiraka returned to the presidency in 1997. Back in power, he packed the National Election Commission and Constitutional Court, harassed opponents, and engaged in fraud, resulting in a slide into competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010: 276-282; Marcus 2001). A final example is the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the country's authoritarian ruling party between 1979 and 1990. After FSLN leader Daniel Ortega democratically returned to the presidency in 2007, his government stacked the Supreme Electoral Council, engaged in fraud, and harassed opponents (Martí i Puig 2013; Thaler 2017). In all three cases, then, the return of authoritarian successor parties to power triggered an authoritarian regression.[68]

But while authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy in a number of ways, they can also have surprisingly salutary effects. First, they can *promote party system institutionalization*. In their classic work, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argue that party system institutionalization is an important determinant of the stability and quality of democracy. Democracy tends to function better when there is stability in interparty competition, parties have relatively deep roots in society, parties

[68] However, it is notable that all three also shared a peculiar characteristic: the person elected president was not simply the candidate of an authoritarian successor party (PRSC, AREMA, and FSLN); he was also a *former dictator* (Balaguer, Ratsiraka, and Ortega). This raises the possibility that it is not authoritarian successor parties as such that cause democratic breakdown, but simply that former dictators tend to act dictatorially. For more on the phenomenon of former dictators being elected back into office—which can occur through authoritarian successor parties, but also through non-authoritarian successor parties and independent candidacies—see Conclusion (Loxton, Chapter 12, this volume).

are largely accepted as the most legitimate route to power, and party organizations are governed by fairly stable rules and structures. In recent years, various scholars have drawn attention to how authoritarian successor parties can help to institutionalize party systems.

In East Central Europe, Grzymala-Busse (2007) finds that where communist parties lost power and successfully regenerated, they helped to structure party systems around a "regime divide." This gave voters a clear choice, and helped to hold newly elected governments accountable, since "[t]he same elite skills that allowed the communist successors to transform after the communist collapse ma[d]e them able critics and highly competent governors" (Grzymala-Busse 2007: 62). In Asia, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 575) argue that "authoritarian, institutionalized parties that are now democratic or maintain some aspects of democracy…serve as the anchor for emerging democratic, institutionalized party systems."[69] In Latin America, K. Roberts (2006, 2016) and Loxton (2014a, 2016) have both found that authoritarian successor parties helped to anchor the right pole of some of the region's most stable party systems, such as Chile and El Salvador. And in Africa, Riedl (2014; Chapter 6, this volume) finds that there is a correlation between strong authoritarian successor parties and party system institutionalization (though this correlation may be the product of a third factor: the strength of authoritarian incumbents at the time of democratization, and thus their ability to impose favorable electoral institutions).

[69] Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015) examine party systems in both democratic *and* authoritarian regimes. As such, some of the parties that they discuss (e.g., Malaysia's UMNO, Singapore's People's Action Party, PAP) would not qualify as authoritarian successor parties, but instead are ruling parties of existing authoritarian regimes. In a hypothetical democratic future, however, it seems likely that parties such as UMNO and PAP would contribute to party system institutionalization, much as the KMT and DJP/Saenuri have done in democratic Taiwan and South Korea, respectively.

Second, authoritarian successor parties can help *to incorporate potential "spoilers" into the democratic system*. A challenge for all democracies is to manage what Linz (1978) called the "disloyal opposition." These are actors who question not only the policies of particular democratic governments, but the legitimacy of the democratic regime itself. Following democratization, there is a danger that former authoritarian incumbents and their supporters will become spoilers. One option for preventing this is to incorporate them into the new democratic regime, thereby reducing incentives for disloyal behavior. While this is clearly in tension with the imperative of pursuing transitional justice,[70] it is arguably better for the stability of democracy—if not necessarily for its quality—to have such actors inside the democratic game as players than outside trying to kick over the board. Given their origins, authoritarian successor parties can play a crucial role in incorporating figures from the previous regime. By giving such figures an institutionalized means to make their voices heard—and even return to power—these parties may help to stabilize new democracies.

In Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia, Slater and Wong (Chapter 10, this volume) find that the KMT, DJP/Saenuri, and Golkar, respectively, all helped to stabilize new democratic regimes. By giving former authoritarian elites an influential position in the new regime, authoritarian successor parties made them "game for democracy." In Tunisia, the only case of successful democratization of the Arab Spring, scholars have likewise found that the emergence of Nidaa Tounes was critical for stabilizing the country's young democracy. By sweeping the legislative and presidential

[70] The potentially intractable nature of this dilemma can be seen in O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) classic work on transitions from authoritarian rule. On the one hand, they argue for securing the vital interests of the military, which includes "[not] seek[ing] sanctions against military offices for 'excesses' committed under the aegis of the authoritarian regime" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 40). On the other, they argue that in extreme cases, it is necessary "to muster the political and personal courage to impose judgment upon those accused of gross violations of human rights under the previous regime" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 30).

elections of 2014, the party made democracy "safe" for figures who might otherwise have felt tempted to subvert the new regime. In Egypt, no equivalent of Nidaa Tounes emerged, which may have contributed to the breakdown of the country's short-lived experiment with democracy by pushing former authoritarian officials and their allies into the disloyal camp.[71] Finally, during Europe's first wave of democratization, Ziblatt (2017; Chapter 11, this volume) finds that "old regime conservative parties"—analogues to modern-day authoritarian successor parties—were a crucial determinant of successful democratization. In countries where strong old regime conservative parties existed, such as Great Britain and Sweden, elites felt less threatened and became "reluctant democrats." In countries where they did not exist, such as Germany and Spain, elites remained enemies of democracy and it was more likely that strong radical right parties would eventually emerge.[72]

Finally, and more speculatively, the existence of authoritarian successor parties may *encourage new transitions to democracy*. As noted previously, a classic argument in the literature on democratic transitions is that the "vital interests" of powerful actors such as the military must be protected for the transition to be successful.[73] While much of this literature focuses on the importance of pacts for providing such safeguards, authoritarian successor parties may play a similar role by serving as vehicles for former authoritarian incumbents in the new regime, as discussed above. Yet the impact of authoritarian successor parties may not be limited to the stabilization of already existing democracies; they may also help to encourage *new* transitions to democracy by

[71] See Ellis Goldberg, "Arab Transitions and the Old Elite," Monkey Cage, *Washington Post* blog, 9 December (2014); Masoud (2011: 30-32; 2013); and Romdhani (2014).
[72] For earlier arguments about the importance of strong conservative parties for democratic stability, see Di Tella (1971-1972), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 62-63, 67), and Gibson (1996). For similar arguments about how authoritarian successor parties can help to stabilize democracy by doubling as conservative parties, see K. Roberts (2006) and Loxton (2014a, 2014b).
[73] See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Karl (1990).

affecting the calculations of authoritarian incumbents. If authoritarian incumbents believe that there is a good chance that they will remain influential under democracy, they have less of an incentive to cling to authoritarianism.

Slater and Wong make this argument in their work on "conceding to thrive," arguing that authoritarian incumbents may initiate their own transitions to democracy on the belief that "*ruling parties can democratize without losing office*" (2013: 717-718; emphases in original).[74] If they have a high degree of "victory confidence"—that is, confidence in their ability to perform well under democracy as authoritarian successor parties—they may decide to concede democracy as part of a new legitimation strategy. Slater and Wong (2013) argue that such calculations were critical to the decisions to democratize in Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia, and that Singapore and Malaysia—and perhaps even China, eventually[75]—are strong candidates for this "democratization through strength" scenario in the future. Not only would parties like the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore and UMNO in Malaysia possess a high degree of victory confidence based on their strong records in office, but they could also derive "democratic hope" (Slater and Wong 2013: 730) from the example of their neighbors. In other words, the success of authoritarian successor parties like the KMT in Taiwan and the DJP/Saenuri in South Korea could have a *demonstration effect*: seeing that former authoritarian incumbents fared well under democracy elsewhere, current

[74] Eventually, however, the normal dynamics of democratic alternation take hold and the party is voted out of office. As Przeworski (1991: 10) reminds us, "[d]emocracy is a system in which parties lose elections." While there are several cases of authoritarian successor parties winning one or more consecutive elections after a transition to democracy, there is only one case of an authoritarian successor party that has *never* lost a democratic election: the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) in Montenegro (Komar and Živković 2016; Vuković 2015). However, this unbroken winning spree is almost certainly an artefact of the country's youth: Montenegro only became an independent country in 2006, and thus has had very few elections. It is likely that the DPS will eventually be voted out of office, like all other authoritarian successor parties.

[75] For a similar argument, see Chu (2012).

authoritarian incumbents in countries such as Singapore and Malaysia could be inspired to initiate their own transitions to democracy.

To conclude, authoritarian successor parties' effects on democracy are double-edged rather than entirely negative. The ratio of benefits to harm, however, is unlikely to be the same across cases. Future research is needed to determine under what circumstances these effects are mainly harmful or mainly salutary.

Plan of the Volume

This volume is structured as follows. Part I examines *why authoritarian successor parties exist—and why they often win elections*. Chapter 2, by Herbert Kitschelt and Matthew Singer, examines the linkage strategies of authoritarian successor parties. Kitschelt and Singer demonstrate through a large-N analysis that former ruling parties of authoritarian regimes that existed for long periods of time often inherited large organizations and informal networks that facilitated clientelistic party-voter linkages under democracy. Chapter 3, by T.J. Cheng and Teh-fu Huang, examines the extraordinary success of Taiwan's KMT and South Korea's DJP/Saenuri. Cheng and Huang show that these parties benefited from various forms of authoritarian inheritance, such as brands based on strong records of economic development and national security, and also skillfully managed issue dynamics under democracy. Chapter 4, by James Loxton and Steven Levitsky, examines personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America. Loxton and Levitsky argue that when former personalistic dictators have sufficiently strong records to run on, their parties can win votes without making a clean break from the past, and in some cases can even "de-personalize" and survive in the long term.

Part II explores *why some authoritarian successor parties are more successful than others*. Chapter 5, by Anna Grzymala-Busse, examines why some communist successor parties that were initially very successful ended up collapsing. Grzymala-Busse shows that while these parties were able to win elections by highlighting their probity and managerial competence, they were later punished by voters when they failed to deliver, becoming "victims of their own success." Chapter 6, by Rachel Beatty Riedl, examines variation in authoritarian successor party performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Riedl argues that much of this was due to the different organizational strategies of former authoritarian regimes: where regimes tried to incorporate local powerbrokers, authoritarian successor parties were more likely to remain cohesive after the transition to democracy; where regimes tried to substitute these brokers with outside officials, parties were likely to collapse. Chapter 7, by Adrienne LeBas, also examines variation in Sub-Saharan Africa, but emphasizes a different causal factor: the competitive landscape. In countries where strong opposition parties existed, LeBas argues that this paradoxically helped authoritarian successor parties by creating an "us-versus-them" dynamic that promoted party cohesion. Chapter 8, by Timothy J. Power, examines Brazil's two authoritarian successor parties, the PDS/PP and PFL/DEM, and tries to explain why they ended up "trading places" in terms of electoral performance. Power argues that the main reason was access to state resources: the PFL/DEM suffered a decline because it lost access to state resources after 2002, while the PDS/PP maintained access and thus remained a significant party.

Part III considers *the effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy*. Chapter 9, by Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, discusses the case of the PRI in Mexico. Flores-Macías finds that the PRI's effects on Mexican democracy have been mostly harmful, due to the party's ongoing association with subnational authoritarianism,

corruption, and human rights abuses. Chapter 10, by Dan Slater and Joseph Wong, looks at Taiwan's KMT, South Korea's DJP/Saenuri, and Indonesia's Golkar, and offers a more sanguine view. Slater and Wong argue that these parties contributed to democratic stability by providing former authoritarian officials with a vehicle for representation and, in so doing, made them "game for democracy." Chapter 11, by Daniel Ziblatt, looks at the first wave's equivalent of authoritarian successor parties, or what he calls "old regime conservative parties." Similar to Slater and Wong, Ziblatt finds that these parties, when strong, contributed to democratic transition and consolidation by converting old regime elites into "reluctant democrats."

The Conclusion (Chapter 12) by James Loxton recaps some of the major themes of the book, and discusses a number of related topics: popular support for authoritarian regimes, the utility of the "authoritarian inheritance-versus-authoritarian baggage" framework, former dictators voted back office, "authoritarian diasporas," the future of authoritarian successor parties, and pathways out of dictatorship.

Appendix 1.1: Authoritarian Successor Parties in the Third Wave of Democracy[i]

Country	Transition to democracy[ii]	Prominent ASP[iii]	ASP returns to power[iv]
Albania	1992-	Yes	Yes
Argentina	1974-76, 1984-	No[v]	No
Bangladesh	1991-2007, 2009-	Yes	Yes
Benin	1992-	No[vi]	No
Bolivia	1983-	Yes	Yes
Brazil	1986-	Yes	No[vii]
Bulgaria	1991-	Yes	Yes
Burundi	1994-96, 2006-	No[viii]	No
Central African Republic	1994-2003	Yes	No
Chile	1990-	Yes	Yes
Congo, Republic of	1993-97	Yes	No[ix]
Croatia	1992-	Yes	Yes
Czech Republic	1993-	Yes	No
Dominican Republic	1979-	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	1980-	No	No
El Salvador	1995-	Yes	Yes
Estonia	1992-	No	No

Georgia	2005-	No	No
Ghana	1980-81, 2001-	Yes	Yes
Greece	1975-	No	No
Guatemala	1996-	Yes	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	2001-02, 2006-	Yes	Yes
Haiti	1991-91, 1995-99, 2007-	No	No
Honduras	1982-	No[x]	No
Hungary	1991-	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	2000-	Yes	No[xi]
Kenya	2003-	No	No
Latvia	1992-	No	No
Lesotho	1994-	Yes	No
Liberia	2006-	No	No
Lithuania	1992-	Yes	Yes
Macedonia	1992-	Yes	Yes
Madagascar	1994-2009	Yes	Yes
Malawi	1995-	Yes	No
Mali	1993-	No	No
Mexico	2001-	Yes	Yes
Moldova	1992-	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	1994-	Yes	Yes
Montenegro	2007-	Yes	Yes
Nepal	1992-2002, 2007-	Yes	Yes

Nicaragua	1991-	Yes	Yes
Niger	1994-96, 2000-	Yes	Yes
Nigeria	1980-83, 2000-	No[xii]	No
Pakistan	1989-99, 2009-	No	No
Panama	1990-	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	1994-	Yes	Yes
Peru	1981-92, 2002-	Yes	No
Philippines	1987-	Yes	No
Poland	1990-	Yes	Yes
Portugal	1977-	No[xiii]	No
Romania	1991-	Yes	Yes
Senegal	2001-	Yes	No
Serbia	2001-	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	1997-97, 1999-	Yes	Yes
Slovakia	1993-	Yes	No[xiv]
Slovenia	1992-	Yes	Yes
South Africa	1995-	No	No
South Korea	1988-	Yes	Yes
Spain	1978-	Yes	Yes
Sri Lanka	1995-	Yes	Yes
Taiwan	2001-	Yes	Yes
Thailand	1976-76, 1989-91, 1993-2006, 2008-	Yes	Yes
Turkey	1984-	Yes	Yes

Ukraine	1992-	Yes	No[xv]
Uruguay	1985-	No	No
TOTAL	**65**	**47**	**35**

[i] The following list of third-wave transitions to democracy is drawn from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) Autocratic Regimes Data Set, which covers all countries with at least one million inhabitants as of 2009. I include all countries that they score as having democratized between 1974 and 2010, except for those in which the new democratic regime broke down before at least one national election could be held after the year of the transition (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mauritania, Russia, Sudan, and Zambia). Excluding such cases is essential for the purposes of this volume, since a core part of the definition of authoritarian successor parties is that they contest elections under democracy, and in cases of immediate democratic breakdown, it was not possible for this condition to be met.

[ii] Following the coding rules used by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, democracy is operationalized as "a regime in which the executive achieved power through a direct competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to compete, and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct competitive elections" (2014b: 9). Elections are not considered to be competitive "if one or more large party is not allowed to participate; and/or if there are widespread reports of violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or supporters; and/or if there are credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change [the] election outcome (especially if reported by international observers); and/or if the incumbent so dominates political resources and the media that observers do not consider elections fair" (2014b: 6). Although this is a minimalist conceptualization of democracy, it nevertheless excludes regimes in which elections are held regularly but are patently unfair (e.g., Belarus, Mozambique, Singapore). In cases where democracy remained in place as late as 2010, this is indicated with an open-ended "-" after the transition year (though some of these democracies broke down after 2010). In cases where democracy broke down or was interrupted prior to 2010, this is indicated with a year after the "-". Following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, the date given for the transition to democracy is "the calendar year for the first January 1 in which the [new] regime holds power" (2014b: 1).

[iii] Authoritarian successor parties are defined as parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes, but that operate after a transition to democracy (Loxton 2015). For the operationalization of transition to democracy, see previous footnote. A party is scored as having emerged from an authoritarian regime if *one* of the following conditions holds:

- It is a former authoritarian ruling party. The party may have been created by authoritarian incumbents for this purpose (e.g., Indonesia's Golkar), or it may have predated the regime, provided that it was created shortly before the onset

of authoritarian rule (e.g., Peru's *Fujimorismo*) or was used by the regime as its ruling party for at least ten years (e.g., Paraguay's Colorado Party).

- It was created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of a transition to democracy (e.g., Chile's UDI), or by former incumbents shortly after a transition to democracy (e.g., Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes). High-level authoritarian incumbents include heads of state, ministers, and key members of the security apparatus. Parties founded by authoritarian incumbents who defect and go into opposition before the transition to democracy are excluded (e.g., Mexico's PRD), as are parties founded more than one election cycle after the transition year identified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) (e.g., Slovakia's Smer-SD).

A party is scored as "prominent" if it wins ten percent or more in a single national election *after* the year of the democratic transition. See Appendix 1.2 for details on individual cases.

[iv] A party is scored as having returned to power if a member of the party occupies the presidency in a presidential system, the prime minister's office in a parliamentary system, or the presidency *or* the prime minister's office in a semi-presidential system. The party member must earn or hold onto this position in an election *after* the year of democratic transition, since founding elections are sometimes less than fully democratic. See Appendix 1.2 for details on individual cases.

[v] As discussed by Loxton and Levitsky (Chapter 4, this volume), Argentina's Justicialista Party (*Peronism*) qualifies as an authoritarian successor party. However, since it emerged during the second wave of democratization, it is not included in this table.

[vi] In 1996, former dictator Mathieu Kérékou was democratically elected back into the presidency. He was elected as an independent, however, with the former authoritarian ruling party, the PRPB, having collapsed during the transition to democracy.

[vii] Although PFL/DEM founder José Sarney occupied the presidency from 1985 to 1990, and although the PFL/DEM and PDS/PP both held cabinet positions in multiple governments under democracy, Brazil is not coded as a case of an authoritarian successor party returning to power, since neither party won/retained the presidency in an election after the founding election.

[viii] Although Burundi's former authoritarian ruling party, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), returned to power after the 1996 coup, it is not included here, since it never won 10 percent in a national election in 1994-1996 or after 2006.

[ix] The Congolese Party of Labor (PCT) did return to power after the 1997 civil war, but it did so through violence, and thus is not coded as a case of an authoritarian successor party returning to power democratically.

[x] Although Honduras' National Party was a partner in the military regime from 1963 to 1971, it is excluded because it long predated military rule and did not serve as its ruling party for at least 10 years.

[xi] Golkar held cabinet positions in multiple governments after Indonesia's transition to democracy. However, because it never won the presidency, it is not coded as a case of an authoritarian successor party returning to power.

[xii] In Nigeria, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), which was founded in 1998 by Olusegun Obasanjo, military dictator from 1976-1979, is excluded because it was formed more than one election cycle after the 1980 transition to democracy. The case

of Obasanjo, who was democratically elected president in 1999 (as well as the case of Muhammadu Buhari, another former dictator who was democratically elected president in 2015) is discussed in the Conclusion (Loxton, this volume).

[xiii] Although several of the founders of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had been members of parliament under Portugal's authoritarian regime, the PSD is not scored as an authoritarian successor party, since none of them had been heads of state, ministers, or high-level members of the security apparatus.

[xiv] The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL') never held the prime minister's office after Slovakia's transition to democracy, and is therefore not coded as a case of an authoritarian successor party returning to power. However, it did hold cabinet positions in a coalition government from 1998 to 2002, and a splinter party formed in 1999, Smer-SD, did reach the prime minister's office in 2012. Although the SDL' merged with Smer-SD in 2005, Smer-SD is not coded as an authoritarian successor party, since it was formed more than one election cycle after the transition to democracy.

[xv] In 1994, Vitaliy Masol, a former prime minister of Ukraine under communism, was appointed prime minister of Ukraine. (See "Choice of New Ukraine Premier Raises Questions about Reform," *The New York Times*, 17 June 1994.) According to Kuzio (2015: 292), Masol was a member of the KPU at the time, which would make this a case of an authoritarian successor party returning to power. Other sources, however, describe Masol as an independent at this time. I therefore err on the side of caution by not including this as a case of an authoritarian successor party returning to power.

Appendix 1.2: Prominent Authoritarian Successor Parties from the Third Wave[i]

Country	**Party**	**Description**[ii]
Albania	Socialist Party of Albania (PS)	Formerly Party of Labor of Albania (PPSh), ruling party under communism. Loses power with transition in 1992, but voted back into office in 1997. Remains one of country's major parties.
Bangladesh	Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	Founded in 1978 by military dictator Ziaur Rahman ("General Zia"). Loses power after Zia's assassination in 1981 and coup in 1982, but returns to power twice under leadership of widow, Khaleda Zia, after transition in 1991.
Bolivia	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)	Founded in 1979 by former military dictator Hugo Banzer after he was overthrown in a coup. One of Bolivia's major parties in 1980s and 1990s, winning the presidency in 1997 with Banzer as candidate. Highly personalistic, and collapses after Banzer's death in 2002.
Brazil	Social Democratic Party	Former ruling party of military regime. Following transition to democracy, never

	(PDS)/Progressive Party (PP)	wins presidency, but forms part of multiple cabinets. Remains a significant actor.
Brazil	Liberal Front Party (PFL)/Democrats (DEM)	Formed in 1985 by defectors of PDS, ruling party of military regime. Holds presidency from 1985-90 (though not directly elected), and forms part of cabinet until 2002. Enters into decline thereafter.
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)	Formerly Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1991 transition, but returns in 1994 and 2005. Remains one of country's major parties.
Central African Republic	Central African Democratic Rally (RDC)	Founded in 1987 by dictator André Kolingba. Loses power in 1993 founding election. Remains major actor during subsequent decade of democracy, but never returns to office.
Chile	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	Founded in 1983 by former officials of military regime during regime crisis. Wins most votes in all legislative elections since 2001 and forms part of cabinet in 2010-14, but never wins presidency. Remains one of country's

		major parties.
Chile	National Renewal (RN)	Founded in 1987 by former officials of military regime and right-leaning democrats. Wins presidency in 2010 with Sebastián Piñera as candidate. Remains one of country's major parties.
Congo, Republic of	Congolese Party of Labor (PCT)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1992 founding election, but performs relatively well in 1993 election. Returns to power after 1997 civil war, but not democratically.
Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)	Formerly League of Communists of Croatia (SKH), Croatian branch of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Loses power in 1990-92 secession and transition to democracy, but returns in 2000 and 2011. Remains one of country's major parties.
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	Formed in 1989 as Czech branch of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1990-93 secession and transition to democracy. Never returns to power, but remains important actor.
Dominican	Social Christian	Former ruling party of dictator Joaquín

Republic	Reformist Party (PRSC)	Balaguer. Party loses power in 1978 founding election, but wins presidency in 1986 with Balaguer as candidate. Highly personalistic, and enters into decline after Balaguer's death in 2002.
El Salvador	Party of National Conciliation (PCN)	Former ruling party of military regime. Loses power in 1979 coup. Never returns to power, but remains relatively important actor during semi-democratic 1980s and after full transition to democracy in 1990s.
El Salvador	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	Founded in 1981 by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, deputy chief of intelligence in pre-1979 military regime and death squad leader in 1980s. Party wins presidency in semi-democratic 1989 election, and in fully democratic elections in 1994, 1999, and 2004. Remains one of country's major parties.
Ghana	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Founded by dictator Jerry John Rawlings in 1992 in anticipation of transition to multiparty elections (and eventually full democracy). Loses power in 2000 election, but returns in 2008 and 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.

Guatemala	Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)	Founded in 1989 by former military dictator Efraín Ríos Montt. Party wins presidency in 1999. Highly personalistic, and enters into decline in 2000s as Ríos Montt loses popularity.
Guinea-Bissau	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1999 coup and 1999-2000 founding election, but returns in 2009, 2012, and 2014. Remains one of country's major parties.
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)	Formerly Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1990 founding election, but returns in 1994 and 2004. Enters into decline in 2010s.
Indonesia	Golkar	Former ruling party of General Suharto's New Order regime. Loses power in 1999 founding election. Forms part of multiple cabinets under democracy, but never wins presidency.
Lesotho	Basotho National Party (BNP)	Former authoritarian ruling party. Loses power in coup in 1986. Performs well in first few elections after 1994 transition, but never returns to office. Enters into decline in late 2000s.

Lithuania	Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDDP)/Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP)	Formerly Communist Party of Lithuania (LKP), Lithuanian branch of Union of Communist Parties-Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UPC-CPSU). Retains power after 1991-92 secession and transition to democracy. Loses power in 1996, but returns in 2001 and 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.
Macedonia	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM)	Formerly League of Communists of Macedonia (CKM), Macedonian branch of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Retains power after 1990-92 secession and transition to democracy. Loses power in 1998, but returns in 2002 and 2015. Remains one of country's major parties.
Madagascar	Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA)	Former ruling party of dictator Didier Ratsiraka. Loses power in founding election of 1993, but wins presidency in 1996 with Ratsiraka as candidate. Enters into decline in 2000s.
Malawi	Malawi Congress Party (MCP)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in founding election of 1994. Never returns to power, but remains one of country's major parties.

Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	Former ruling party of hegemonic-party regime. Loses power in 2000 transition, but continues to dominate subnational politics and wins presidency in 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.
Moldova	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM)	Formerly Moldovan branch of Union of Communist Parties-Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UPC-CPSU). Loses power in 1991-92 secession and transition to democracy, but returns in 2001 and 2005. Remains one of country's major parties.
Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)/Mongolian People's Party (MPP)	Former ruling party under communism. Loses presidency in founding election of 1993 and parliament in 1996, but wins presidency in 1997, 2001, and 2005, and parliament in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2016. Remains one of country's major parties.
Montenegro	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS)	Formerly League of Communists of Montenegro (SKCG), Montenegrin branch of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Since country's independence in 2006, party has never lost power. Only authoritarian successor

		party to do so.
Nepal	Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)	Founded in 1990 in anticipation of transition to democracy by officials of monarchical Panchayat regime (e.g., former prime ministers Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Surya Bahadur Thapa). Performs relatively well in 1990s, with both Chand and Thapa returning as prime ministers. Enters into decline in 2000s.
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	Former authoritarian ruling party. Loses power in founding election of 1990, but returns after winning 2006 presidential election with former dictator Daniel Ortega as its candidate. Remains one of country's major parties.
Niger	National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD)	Founded in 1989 by military regime. Loses power in 1993 founding election. After 1996 coup, wins new founding election in 1999 and also 2004 election. Remains in office until 2010 coup.
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)	Founded in 1979 by military dictator Omar Torrijos as ruling party, and also used by Manuel Noriega as ruling party in 1980s. Loses power in 1989-90 US

		invasion and transition to democracy, but wins presidency in 1994 and 2004. Remains one of country's major parties.
Paraguay	Colorado Party	Ruling party of authoritarian regime from 1940s onward. Remains in power after 1994 transition, but defeated in 2008. Returns to presidency in 2013. Remains one of country's major parties.
Peru	Popular Force *(Fujimorismo)*[iii]	Ruling party of Alberto Fujimori's 1992-2000 competitive authoritarian regime. Loses power with Fujimori's resignation and transition to democracy. Has not returned to presidency, but remains one of country's major parties.
Philippines	Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)	Former ruling party of dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Loses power with Marcos' 1986 overthrow and transition to democracy. Party does poorly in most elections, but wins over 10 percent in 1992 presidential election with Imelda Marcos, former dictator's widow, as candidate. Borderline case for inclusion.
Poland	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland	Formerly Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1989-90 founding

	(SdRP)/Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	elections, but returns by winning parliamentary elections in 1993 and 2001, and presidential elections in 1995 and 2000. Enters into decline after 2005.
Poland	Polish Peasants' Party (PSL)	Former satellite party of the PZPR, ruling party under communism. Allied with SdRP/SLD for much of democratic period. Holds prime minister's office in 1992 and 1993-95. Remains somewhat significant actor.
Romania	National Salvation Front (FSN)/ Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN)/Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR)/Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Emerges from the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), ruling party under communism. Wins founding election of 1990 and 1992 election. Loses power in 1996, but wins presidency and prime minister's office in 2000. Remains one of country's major parties.
Romania	National Salvation Front (FSN)/ Democratic Party (PD)/Democratic	Party is result of split in the FSN in lead-up to 1992 election. Wins prime minister's office after winning largest number of seats in 2008 election.

	Liberal Party (PDL)	Remains one of country's major parties.
Senegal	Socialist Party of Senegal (PS)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in founding election of 2001. Performs relatively well in 2001 parliamentary election, but then enters into rapid decline.
Serbia	Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)	Formerly League of Communists of Serbia (SKS), Serbian branch of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Loses power with fall of Slobodan Milošević and founding election of 2000. Holds prime minister's office in 2012-14 and 2017. Remains one of country's major parties.
Sierra Leone	All People's Congress (APC)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1992 coup and subsequent civil war. Following 1999 transition, wins presidency in 2007 and 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.
Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left (SDL')	Formerly Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), Slovak branch of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ). Loses power in 1990-93 secession and transition to democracy. Never returns to

		power. In 2005, merges with Smer-SD, splinter party that broke from SDL' in 1999.
Slovenia	United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD)/ Social Democrats (SD)	Formerly League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS), Slovenian branch of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Loses power in 1990-92 secession and transition to democracy, but forms part of multiple cabinets and holds prime minister's office in 2008-12. Remains relatively significant actor.
South Korea	Democratic Justice Party (DJP)/Democratic Liberal Party (DLP)/Grand National Party (GNP)/Saenuri	Former ruling party of military regime installed by Park Chung-hee. Retains power after 1987-88 transition to competitive elections. Loses power in 1997, but returns in 2007 and 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.
Spain	Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)	Founded in 1977 by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez and other officials of Francisco Franco regime. Wins founding election of 1977 and 1979 election, but then collapses in early 1980s.
Spain	People's Alliance (AP)/People's Party	Founded in 1976 by former minister Manuel Fraga and other officials of

	(PP)	Franco regime. Remains out of office for several years, before winning in 1996, 2000, 2011, 2015, and 2016. Remains one of country's major parties.
Sri Lanka	United National Party (UNP)	Former ruling party of 1978-94 authoritarian regime. Loses power in 1994 transition, but wins prime minister's office in 2001 and 2015 parliamentary election (though not presidency). Remains one of country's major parties.
Taiwan	Kuomintang (KMT)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 2000 election, but returns in 2008 and 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.
Thailand	New Aspiration Party (NAP)	Founded in 1990 by General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, former Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces during military rule. Party wins election in 1996; Chavalit becomes prime minister. Collapses in 2000s.
Turkey	Motherland Party (ANAP)	Founded in 1983 by Turgut Özal, former deputy prime minister responsible for the economy under military rule. Wins founding election of 1983 and 1987 election; Özal becomes prime minister

		and later president. Enter into decline in 2000s.
Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)	Formerly Ukrainian branch of Union of Communist Parties-Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UPC-CPSU). Loses power with collapse of communism and briefly banned. Major actor in 1990s, but does not return to power. Enters into decline in 2000s.
Ukraine	Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)	Founded in 1991 by former communist officials such as Oleksandr Moroz after Communist Party banned. Moroz wins over 10 percent in 1994 and 1999 presidential elections, but otherwise borderline case. Enters into decline in 2000s.

Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties[iv]

Country	**Party**	**Description**
Cape Verde	African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in founding elections of 1991, but returns in 2001 and 2006. Remains one of country's major parties. Not included in main table because Cape

		Verde does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) population threshold.
Germany	Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/The Left	Formerly Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), ruling party of communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). Following transition to democracy in 1990, PDS crosses 10-percent threshold in all federal elections in former GDR, and after becoming The Left, wins over 10 percent nationally in 2009. Not included in main table, however, because GDR ceased to exist in 1990, and much larger West Germany, which absorbed it in national reunification, democratized decades earlier and thus not a third-wave democracy.
Guyana	People's National Congress (PNC)	Former authoritarian ruling party. Loses power in founding election of 1992, but returns in 2015. Not included in main table because Guyana does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) population threshold.
São Tomé and Príncipe	Movement for the Liberation of São	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1991 transition, but

	Tomé and Príncipe/Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD)	remains one of country's major parties. Not included in main table because São Tomé and Príncipe does not meet does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) population threshold.
Suriname	National Democratic Party (NDP)	Founded in 1987 by military dictator Dési Bouterse in anticipation of transition to competitive elections. Party returns to power in 2010 and 2015, and Bouterse becomes president. Not included in main table because Suriname does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) population threshold.
Tunisia	Nidaa Tounes	Founded in 2012 during democratic transition by Beji Caid Essebsi, former official of Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali dictatorships. Wins presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014. Not included in main table because formed after 2010, last year for inclusion in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a).

[i] The main table of this appendix provides information on all authoritarian successor parties that emerged between 1974 and 2010 in countries with at least one million inhabitants as of 2009, and which won at least 10 percent of the vote in a national election after the year of transition to democracy. See Appendix 1.1 for a full list of democratic transitions.

[ii] The descriptions in this appendix draw on the following sources. Albania: Bajrovic and Satter (2014). Bangladesh: Hossain (2004). Bolivia: Loxton and Levitsky (this

volume). Brazil: Power (this volume). Bulgaria: Spirova (2008). Central African Republic: Mehler (2005). Chile: Loxton (2014a). Republic of Congo: Clark (1997); Englebert and Ron (2004). Croatia: Šedo (2010a). Czech Republic: Grzymala-Busse (2002, this volume). Dominican Republic: Hartlyn (1998); Agosto and Cueto Villamán (2001). El Salvador: Loxton (2014a). Ghana: Riedl, this volume); LeBas (this volume). Guatemala: Loxton and Levitsky (this volume). Guinea-Bissau: Magalhães Ferreira (2004); O'Regan (2015). Hungary: Grzymala-Busse (2002, this volume). Indonesia: Slater and Wong (this volume). Lesotho: Makoa (1996, 2004). Lithuania: Clark and Praneviciute (2008). Macedonia: Šedo (2010b). Madagascar: Marcus (2001); Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005). Malawi: Posner (1995); LeBas (this volume). Mexico: Flores-Macías (2013, this volume). Moldova: March (2006). Mongolia: Fish (1998a); Fritz (2008). Montenegro: Vuković (2015); Komar and Živković (2016). Nepal: Baral (1995); Sharma, Stevens, and Weller (2008). Nicaragua: Martí i Puig (2013); Thaler (2017). Niger: Ibrahim and Souley (1998). Panama: Loxton and Levitsky (this volume). Paraguay: Abente-Brun (2009); Turner (2014). Peru: Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016); Loxton and Levitsky (this volume). Philippines: Putzel (1995); Hicken (2015). Poland: Grzymala-Busse (2002, this volume). Romania: Pop-Eleches (2008). Senegal (Riedl, this volume). Serbia: Bochsler (2010). Sierra Leone: Wyrod (2008). Slovakia: Gryzmala-Busse (2002, this volume); Haughton (2004); Haughton and Rybar (2008). Slovenia: Fink-Hafner (2006). South Korea: Cheng and Huang (this volume); Slater and Wong (this volume). Spain: Hopkin (1999); Balfour (2005). Sri Lanka: de Silva (1997); DeVotta (2002). Taiwan: Cheng and Huang (this volume); Slater and Wong (this volume). Thailand: McCargo (1997). Turkey: Kalaycioglu (2002); Haggard and Kaufman (1995). Ukraine: Zimmer and Haran (2008); Kuzio (2015). Cape Verde: Meyns (2002). Germany: Patton (2011); Doerschler and Banaszak (2007). Guyana: Singh (2008). São Tomé and Príncipe: Seibert (2006). Suriname: Weyden (2006); Marchand (2014). Tunisia: Wolf (2014); Lefèvre (2015).

[iii] *Fujimorismo* has gone by several different names over the years, including Change 90, New Majority, Let's Go Neighbor, Peru 2000, and Force 2011. Since 2012, it has been called Popular Force.

[iv] The following countries are not included in the main table of this appendix or in the list of third-wave democracies in Appendix 1.1 because of small population size, date of formation, or other excluding factors (see individual country entries for details). However, I include them in this secondary table because of their significance in the countries in which they operate.

Figure 1.1. Authoritarian Successor Parties in Third-Wave Democracies, 1974-2010